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Generally speaking, scholarship in the field of Germanistik has taken an interest in 
Friedrich Schlegel’s early publication, “Vom aesthetischen Werte der griechischen Komoedie” 
(1794), either because of its perceived influence on German Romantic Comedy [(Catholy 1982), 
(Kluge 1980), (Holl 1923), (Japp 1999)], or else because of its relevance as an example of 
Schlegel's still inchoate aesthetic philosophy [(Dierkes 1980), (Behrens 1984), (Schanze 1966), 
(Michel 1982), (Dannenberg 1993), (Mennemeier 1971)].  As a theory of comedy in its own 
right, Schlegel’s essay has garnered little attention, in part because of its supposed inapplicability 
to comedic praxis and at times utopian implications, in part because of its seemingly 
contradictory argument, and lastly in part because Schlegel himself abandoned the essay’s 
central premise soon after its publication.  However, it is the central argument of the present 
study that Schlegel’s essay can be shown to be interesting and relevant precisely for the theory of 
comedy it contains.  Through a close reading of Schlegel’s essay on Old Greek Comedy, as well 
as an examination of Schlegel’s early political and aesthetic b liefs, which will help render 
Schlegel’s theory more intelligible, it will be shown that Schlegel’s theory of comedy is novel in 
so far as it is one of the first aesthetic theories to claim that comedic practice is necessarily 
deprived of aesthetic validity unless it exists in a social atmosphere of freedom of expression, 
namely, such as that of the Athenians.  The implication is that Schlegel here predicates an 
aesthetic theory upon one of society.  Schlegel’s theory is also interesting for the peculiar type of 
comedy it advocates, namely a joyous comedy (Comedy of ‘Freude’), which stands in direct 







comedic mechanism (joy) that is anathema to traditional negative comedic elements (satire, 
derision, mockery etc.).  The conclusion discusses what the relevance and value of these 
















































I would like to express my deep gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Stefanie Ohnesorg, who 
helped me to develop what was originally only a vague interest in German Idealism into a more 
focused research project which yielded, I hope, interesting conclusions.  Not only did my desire 
to meet her standards force me to transcend what I myself believed I was capable of, but her 
continuous support and suggestions helped me to tighten my argument and to write nly that 
which could be supported by my research.  I would also like to thank my thesis committee 
members, Dr. Daniel Magilow and Dr. Maria Stehle, who took the timeout of their busy 



































Chapter              Page 
 
I Introduction ………………………………………………………………. 1 
II Publication History and Review of Secondary Research ………………… 9  
II.1 Reception of Schlegel’s Aristophanes-Essay 
in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries ………………………………………. 13 
II.2 Post-WWII Research Trends ……………………………………………... 15 
II.2.1   Scholarship on Schlegel’s Early Aesthetic-Philosophical Method ………. 16 
II.2.2 Scholarship on Schlegel’s Political Philosophy ………………………….. 19 
II.2.3 Scholarship on the Relevance of Schlegel’s Essay  
for German Romantic Comedy …………………………………………… 20 
II.2.4 Scholarship on the Relevance of Schlegel’s Essay for the European, 
Specifically German, Reception of Aristophanes ………………………... 22 
III Cultural Landscape: Prerequisites for a Proper Understanding  
of Schlegel’s Theory………………………………………………………. 24 
III.1 Relevant Intellectual Trends in Germany in the 1790s …………………... 24 
III.1.1 The Impact of the French Revolution on Schlegel’s Style and Intent ……. 26 
III.1.2 The Influence of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft  
on Schlegel’s Aesthetic Approach ……………………………………….. 29  
III.2 Programmatics in Schlegel’s Aristophanes-Essay ……………………….. 34 
III.3 Schlegel’s Early Critical-Historical Project:  
Implications for the Aristophanes-Essay ………………………………… 42 
IV        Towards Schlegel’s Theory of Comedy as  
Argued in his Essay on Aristophanes……...…………………………….. 49 
IV.1 Anthropological Basis: The Concept of Freude …………………………. 50 
IV.2 ‘Inner’ Freedom in Man and in Dramatic Form 
  as Requirements for Freude ………………………………………………. 59  
IV.3 ‘Outer Freedom’ and the Freedom of Expression ……………………….. 66  
IV.4 The Festivity of Greek Comedy ………………………………………….. 71 
IV.5 Logical Implications of Positing an Ideal:  
Reasons for Ideal’s Unattainability ………………………………………. 74 
V Schlegel’s Early Political Thought and its Implications  
for his Theory of Comedy ………………………………………………… 83 
VI Conclusion………………………………………………….……………... 90  
 Appendix …………....…………………………………………………….. 102 
 Works Cited ………………………………………………………………. 104 








In October 1794, Friedrich Schlegel sent his brother, August Wilhelm, a copy of an essay he 
had been working on for close to a year under the working title “Apologie des Aristophanes” 1.  It 
was, he wrote, “nur eine Rhapsodie, die künftig einen Teil der Geschichte der Griechischen 
Komödie ausmachen wird” (Let. to A.W. 10-27-1794) 2.  Nevertheless he conceded to his brother 
that he had taken pains to make the essay’s argument cogent and its style clear: “Ich gab mir 
Mühe die Sprache leicht, und den Zusammenhang fließend zu machen, das Gehackte zu meiden, 
was Du mit Recht immer an mir tadelst” (ibid.).  The essay’s publication came a few months 
later in the December issue of the B rlinsche Monatschrift under the title Vom ästhetischen 
Werte der griechischen Komödie (KAI 19-33).  It was Schlegel’s first publication, and it became 
one of his most well-known and well-regarded early works3.  In part, its fame at the time rested 
on the fact that the essay – as its initial title indicates – was seen as a defense of Aristophanes’ 
worth as a playwright.  In it Schlegel did more than simply defend the famous Greek 
playwright’s place in the comedic canon against what he saw as a long and unfair tradition of 
dismissal from primarily French criticism. Schlegel champions Aristophanes’ plays as the 
                                                
1 The earliest mention of the essay is in a letter to his brother dating from December 11, 1793 (Kritische Friedrich-
Schlegel-Ausgabe XXIII 162).  We cannot know for sure how long he had lready been working on his essay on 
Aristophanes, but in that letter he claims that it nd a few others studies, “werden auch wohl zugleich fertig werden” 
(Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe XXIII 164). 
2 All the letters by Friedrich Schlegel used in this study are addressed to his brother, August Wilhelm.  For brevity’s 
sake, citations of these letters will hereafter be followed by a parenthetical citation in the form, (Let. to AW, 4-5-
1794).  The reader will find a list of the page numbers as well as the volume in the Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-
Ausgabe where these letters are to be found in the appendix that follows the present study. 
3 In his introduction to volume one of the KA, which includes all of Schlegel’s early works on Classical literature, 
Ernst Behler cites the positive reception that Schlegel’s essay found with a number of his contemporaries; among 
them Christian Gottfried Körner and Friedrich Creuzr (Behler Einleitung CXLIVf.).  Behler, whose immense 
scholarship on Friedrich Schlegel helped yield the very helpful Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe (KA), will be 






genre’s finest.  “Die alte griechische Komödie”, he writes, “ist eins der wichtigsten Dokumente 
für die Theorie der komischen Kunst; denn in der ganzen Geschichte der Kunst sind ihre 
Schönheiten einzig, und vielleicht deswegen allgemein verkannt” (KAI 20)4.  In addition, the 
essay attracted attention at the time of its publication and, indeed, has maintained an appeal ever 
since because of its surprisingly novel approach to the theory of comedy, eschewing completely 
the familiar concepts and schemata of Enlightenment theories of comedy, and choosing instead 
to build a theory from an entirely different set of premises, which S hlegel developed from his 
understanding of Old Greek Comedy.  The vindication of Aristophanes, which followed 
naturally, amounted to a theoretically backed endorsement for a new comedic ideal.  In recent 
years, a fair amount of scholarship in Romantikforschung has sought to examine the extent to 
which this new comedic ideal corresponds with the Romantic plays of Tieck, Brentano, and 
Arnim5.  It is important to note, however, that Schlegel himself was only secondarily interested 
in clearing Aristophanes’ name.  Primarily, he was concerned with developing a sound theory of 
comedy.  In fact, from around 1793 to 1796, Schlegel had been immersed in an ambitious effort 
to develop a general theory of literature, which would arrive at the essential elements of the 
various traditional literary genres by examining the history of their ‘birth’ and development 
under the Greeks, and to a lesser extent, Romans.  Though Schlegel never completed this work, 
and after 1796 turned his attention increasingly to post-Classical literature (B hler 
Selbstzeugnisse 44), the theory of comedy that he developed in his essay on Aristophanes is one 
                                                
4 Throughout his essay on Aristophanes, Schlegel taks the term ‘Old Greek Comedy’ to be synonymous with the 
plays of Aristophanes, since these were the only complete plays known to him to have originated during that period. 






the most realized theories of any genre from this early period of his career, and it has made its 
way into the canon of German theories of comedy6.   
 Inasmuch as Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay is meant to be a systematic and complete 
theory of comedy, it is remarkably short; 20 pages in its original printing.  To a large extent, 
Schlegel was capable of such brevity because his theory is quite bare; it ascribes to the comedic 
ideal only a few essential qualities.   
Schlegel’s explanation of what he believes to be the true essence of comedy follows from 
three sources:  
1. his assumptions about human nature and the human purpose; in other words, his 
anthropological beliefs and his Bildungstheorie, respectively;  
2. his understanding of the social practice of Greek Comedy; and  
3. his interpretation of Aristophanes’ plays themselves.   
Schlegel begins his essay on Greek Comedy by positing the concept of Freude both as a 
fundamental characteristic of human nature, and also as a positive personal and social value.  He 
then describes how this value is obtained at the personal level, arguing that individuals realize 
their capacity for Freude through wanton and purposeless activity.  According to Schlegel, 
comedy’s essential characteristic is that it functions as a symbol of Freude, and he sees the 
comedic ritual as an act that brings individuals together in a collective celebration of Freude.  An 
essential prerequisite to the success of this ritual is that the community in which a comedy is 
produced and staged guarantee – through religious, political or some other form of protection – 
comedy’s complete freedom of expression. Schlegel then shows how Greek Comedy most 
                                                
6 See for example, Profitlich’s Komödientheorie: Texte und Kommentare vom Barock bis zur Gegenwart (1998), 






closely resembled what he sees as the comedic ideal, and further explains what kept Greek 
Comedy from fully realizing this ideal.  The implication is that since Schlegel’s ideal had not yet 
been fully realized, it could only, if ever, be achieved by future generations.   
This is an extremely brief summary of Schlegel’s argument, and it will be one of the main 
objectives of the present study to explain this theory in more detail.  Yet, a few important aspects 
are already apparent from the description above.  First and foremost, Schlegel’s theory is 
normative and programmatic.  He describes an aesthetic ideal, not n interpretive framework for 
understanding the mechanisms behind comedy.  And more than being an aesthetic ideal against 
which existing plays might be judged, Schlegel’s theory of comedy – or more appropriately, 
theory of a comedic ideal – concerns itself with understanding the ess nce of the comedic spirit.  
Thus, his theory ill lends itself to the judging of actual comedies.  To the extent that a vast 
number of comedies make no effort to symbolize Fr ude, they could not even be classified as 
comedies under his framework.  
Schlegel’s theory is also peculiar to the extent that it is asmuch a normative theory of society 
as it is of comedy.  His argument is explicitly anchored in a moral/anthropological premise.  For 
him, what comedy should be is inherently linked to what society should be, which in this 
context, is itself a function of what is good and fitting for indivi uals.  This normative aspect of 
Schlegel’s theory is the central interest of the present study, which intends to outline the socio-
political implications of Schlegel’s theory of comedy.  It will seek to answer from a descriptive 
standpoint, what place Schlegel sees comedy as having in society and from a normative 
standpoint, what role Schlegel believes comedy should play in society.  This requires that I first 






Doing so will allow me to uncover the socio-politically predicated components of Schlegel’s 
theory.  In the end, I hope to show that Schlegel’s theory of comedy is implicitly political, since 
it defends and requires a limited form of freedom of expression, and that furthermore, parts of 
Schlegel’s theory imply a democratic state structure – in the Athenian sense – as an aesthetic 
necessity.  
It must be stated at the outset that this study does not attempt o arrive at a comprehensive 
understanding of Friedrich Schlegel’s views on comedy; that is to say, it does not attempt to 
explore Schlegel’s general attitude towards comedy throughout his life.  Rather, this study seeks 
to best understand the theory of comedy laid down in Schlegel’s essay on Aristophanes.  To the 
extent that there are ambiguities in that essay, recourse will be made to Schlegel’s 
contemporaneous letters and publications.  Thus what is sometimes tered the post-Fichtean 
Schlegel is of no real interest here.   
 After giving a brief publication history of the Aristophanes-essay and an overview of the 
current body of relevant research, which is the aim of Chapter II, I will address in Chapter III, 
three prerequisites for a proper understanding of Schlegel’s theory, ach in individual 
subchapters.  Subchapter III.1 concerns itself with certain assumptions of German aesthetic 
philosophy in the 1790s which Schlegel takes as given.  A modern understanding of Schlegel’s 
own theory of comedy is only possible if one considers it within the context of the language of 
German aesthetic philosophy in the 1790s7.  Schlegel’s theory operates primarily by bringing a 
                                                
7 In proposing this, I choose a methodological approach not unlike Gadamer’s in Truth and Method, who claims that 
in order to properly examine the issue of the humanistic tradition in the late 18th century, and more specifically for 
him, the hermeneutic tradition, one is well-served to historicize key aesthetic terms which we might at first take as 
self-evident: “Key concepts and words which we still use acquired their special stamp then [i.e. during the Age of 






few key concepts into play with one another and as such, eludes easy comprehension, because it 
assumes a contemporary understanding of the terminology used.  Abstract terms like Freiheit, 
Schönheit and Freude are made liberal use of and are central to the theoretical framework of his 
argument.  It is important to remember that they also have historically bound meanings, and we 
will be led astray if we approach this text without taking the trouble to define them in their 
historical context.  It is well known, for instance, that the notion of Freiheit played a ubiquitous 
role in the social and political rhetoric of the Enlightenment8 and later became a central 
theoretical component of German writings on literary aesthetics in the wake Kant’s publication 
of the Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790). Martin Holtermann, in his discussion of the German 
reception of Aristophanes in the 1790s makes the apt point that the notion of freedom plays a 
central role not only in Schlegel’s theory of comedy, but also in may of his contemporaries’ 
theories of comedy as well9.   
 Subchapter III.2 addresses the programmatic component of Schlegel’s essay on 
Aristophanes.  Schlegel’s effort to understand comedy is, in part, motivated by a desire to rectify 
                                                                                                                                                             
we must face a whole host of questions about verbal and conceptual history.  In what follows it is possible to do no 
more than begin the great task that faces investigators, as an aid to our philosophical inquiry.  Concepts such as ‘art’, 
‘history’, ‘genius’[…] which we take to be self-evident, contain a wealth of history” (Gadamer 9).  Furthe more, 
Schlegel’s aesthetic philosophy during this time, it has been often claimed, is best understood as a sub-movement of 
German Idealism or – as it has sometimes been termed –Transcendental Philosophy.  For example, Ernst Behler 
writes: “Friedrich Schlegel [war sich] darüber im klaren, daß seine Sehweise oder Darstellung der griechischen 
Bildung eine auf der Transzendentalphilosophie beruh nde ‘Geschichte des Bewußtseins’ war, ‘die [er] da und nicht 
in der künstlichen Methode suchte’” (Behler Einleitung LXXVII).  [Behler quotes from Schlegel (KAXV Studien 
des Altertums, Nr. 2)].  Thus it will be necessary in what follows to base definitions of aesthetic terms not only on 
the Aristotles-derived poetic systems of the Baroque and early Enlightenment but also on German philosophy of the 
late 18th century, which took, as it did, a great interest in matters of art.  
8 Peter Gay expresses what has become a truism of our understanding of the Enlightenment when he writes that 
“freedom” is the unifying theme of the Enlightenment program: “The men of the Enlightenment were united on a 
vastly ambitious program […] of […] above all, freedom in its many forms” (Gay 3). 
9 Holtermann (pg. 96) cites others who have remarked on the centrality of freedom in theories of comedy during the 
1790’s; for example Beare’s Theorie der Komödie (1927): “Diese Freiheitsforderung ist überall in der Theorie der 
Zeit zu spüren” (Beare 67), and Walzel’s  “Aristophanische Komödien”: “Das Schlagwort Freiheit beherrscht 






what he sees as the inadequacies of some of the most prevalent tendenci s in 18th century 
theories of comedy.  His essay constitutes an implied attack on those who he believes had 
misunderstood comedy’s essence and had, as a consequence, dismissed Aristophanes’ worth.  In 
addition, his proclamation of a new comedic ideal is meant to demonstrate the inadequacies of 
prevalent comedic genres in the mid to late 18th century, like the comédie larmoyante, the 
Familiengemälde and similar emerging bourgeois comedic styles.   
 Subchapter III.3 gives a brief overview of Schlegel’s general early project of developing 
a historically based literary aesthetic system from the corpus of Classical literature.  As I 
mentioned above, Schlegel intended to eventually supplement his theory of comedy with theories 
of all the various Classical genres.  In fact, everything that he wrote during his study of Classical 
literature was done so with one eye toward this ultimate goal.  Thus, a sound understanding of 
his theory of comedy necessitates that one understand the contours of his general attitude toward 
Classical literature and his general aesthetical-historical approach to literary theory during this 
period.  Most importantly, Schlegel’s theory of comedy only makes sense if one is acquainted 
with his understanding of Greek tragedy.  For example, one explanation that he gives, in the 
Aristophanes-essay for “die Natur des Komischen” is that it is, per definition, devoid of 
“tragische Energie” (KAI 20).  Schlegel sees the ideal comi al and the ideal tragical as absolute 
opposites, and periodically in this study, explanations of his theory of comedy will follow from 






elsewhere in his early writings, I will make use of these other writings to help clarify the 
tragedy/comedy dichotomy as he understood it10. 
 Following Chapter III, I turn in Chapter IV to a close reading of the Aristophanes-essay 
itself, with the goal of presenting a faithful and logical formulation of Schlegel’s theory.  I hope 
to show what Schlegel believes the comedic ideal means for the individual, what it means for the 
form that a given comedy should take, and what it means for society at large.  Chapter V is an 
excursus into Schlegel’s early political thought, which will allow me to return to the question of 
the extent to which his theory is predicated on certain political structures and socio-political 
rights.  The conclusion (Chapter VI) addresses the question of what contemporary scholarship 
might stand to gain from Schlegel’s theory of comedy and what his theory’s applicability, if any, 






                                                
10 It is necessary here to list the main texts by Schlegel that will be used in the following study.  Of course the 
central text for this study is his Vom ästhetischen Werte der Griechischen Komödie (1794) (KAI 19-33).  Excerpts 
from this text constitute the vast majority of the citations from Schlegel that are found in this study.  However, in the 
construction of my argument, I have found it necessary to supplement Schlegel’s thoughts in that essay with others 
that can be found, for the most part, in his writings (both published and unpublished) and letters from the time.  The 
reader will notice that besides the Aristophane-essay, the present study draws here and there from Schlegel’s other 
writings on Classical topics, which are taken for the most part from vol. 1 of the Kritische Ausgabe, and to a lesser 
degree from vol. 11.  Schlegel’s letters to his brother August, particularly those written between 1793 and 1795, are 
used to clarify certain aspects of Schlegel’s methodology and approach; these are taken from vol. 23. Likewise, 
Schlegel’s unpublished sketch of a system of aesthetics (1795/96) entitled Von der Schönheit in der Dichtkunst aids 
in the same pursuit.  Lastly, my formulation of Schlegel’s early political beliefs is based largely on his publication, 
Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus, which is in vol. 7.  For an entire list of the ind vidual publications, 






II Publication History and Review of Secondary Research 
 
Friedrich Schlegel’s investigation of Aristophanes’ plays, and reassessment of their 
contemporary worth, was a relatively small undertaking.  It was part of a general study of Greek 
– and to a lesser extent Roman – literature, which occupied him intensely over the course of 
several years, and the resulting essay, Vom ästhetischen Werte der griechischen Komödie, which 
his study of Aristophanes’ plays engendered, can only be accurately understoo  in this context11.  
After his move to Dresden in 1794, Schlegel embarked on a partly systematic, partly 
random study of Greek literature, reading virtually everything on the subject that he could get his 
hands on, and making plans for studies that began to multiply “in verwirrende A zahl”12.  By 
April 1794, the impetus behind his various studies had coalesced into a more comprehensive 
project, one that would constitute both a history of Greek literature nd a genre-centered theory 
of literature that developed from his historical account and at the same time helped make sense 
of it:  
 
Das Werk ist […] von noch größerm Umfange, als Du angiebst. – Die Geschichte der 
Griech.[ischen] Poesie ist eine vollständige Naturgeschichte des Schönen und der 
                                                
11 Years later (1822), Schlegel reflected fondly on the supreme importance of the Greeks for him in his youth: “In 
dem ersten Jünglingsalter von etwa siebzehn Jahren, bildeten die Schriften des Plato, die tragischen Dichter der 
Griechen, und Winckelmanns begeisterte Werke, meine geistige Welt und die Umgebung, in der ich lebte, und wo 
ich mir, in meiner dichterisch nachdenkenden Einsamkeit, wohl oft auch nach jugendlicher Art, die Ideen und 
Gestalten der alten Götter und Helden in der Seele vozubilden versuchte” (KAIV 4). 
12 In July of 1795, he had sketched out in a letter to his brother the various studies he was planning.  They included, 
“Über antiken und modernen Republikanismus”, “Über die Grenzen des Schönen”, “Sophokles”, “Fragment aus 
einer Geschichte der attischen Tragödie”, “Vom Wert d s Studiums der Griechen und Römer”, “Über die Diotima”, 
“Über die Darstellung der Weiblichkeit in den griechischen Dichtern”, “Über die politischen Revolutionen der 
Griechen und Römer”, “Theorie der Geschichte der Menschheit”, “Über die alte Religion”, “Briefe über den 
Plutarch”, “Über den griechischen Rhythmus”, and “Alte Politik in zwei Bänden” (Let to A.W. 7-4-1795).  What is 
perhaps most surprising is not the number of studies that Schlegel was undertaking simultaneously, but rather the 






Kunst, daher ist mein Werk – Aesthetik.  Diese ist bisher noch nichterfunden, sie ist 
das philosophische Resultat der Geschichte der Aesthetik und auch der einzige Schlüßel 
derselben (Let. to A.W. 4-5-1794). 
 
 
Schlegel planned on publishing a two-volume work, Die Griechen und Römer, which – he 
had hoped – would be authoritative as an aesthetic treatise and as a Cl sical literary history 
(Behler Einleitung CLXI); the first volume would discuss theory, the second would apply it to 
Classical praxis.  Ultimately, only the first volume made it to paper, but it did establish Schlegel 
as an authority on Classical literature13.  Based on this publication, it was certainly imaginable 
that he was poised for an illustrious career as a Classical philologist, and that he would be 
successful in his wish to do for Greek literature, “was Winckelmann für die bildende [Kunst] 
versuchte; nämlich die Theorie derselben durch die Geschichte zu begründen” (KAIII 334).  
This, then, is the context in which Schlegel wrote his Aristophanes-essay.  And though he never 
developed it further into the section on Greek comedy that he intended for the uncompleted 
second volume of his planned work, it nevertheless became, on its own, one of the most famous 
works from Schlegel’s early career, and its high praise for Aristophanes is one of the main 
reasons behind the ‘rediscovery’ of that author in 19th century Germany.   
 Predictably, scholarship into Schlegel’s early writings, and particularly the Aristophanes-
essay, has waxed and waned, taking various forms, depending on its perceived contemporaneous 
relevance.  However, research into these early writings on Classical literature has always 
remained “ein Stiefkind in der Forschung” as Hans Dierkes wrote in his expansive study of 
                                                
13 The form that the first volume eventually took alre dy shows Schlegel’s move away from pure 
Altertumswissenschaft to the interest in modern literature which would characterize his middle – or Romantic – 
period since it outlines in depth the Ancient/Modern dichotomy that would form the fundament of his notion of the 






Schlegel’s literary-historical method in 1980 (47).  Schlegel’s fame does, after all, rest 
principally on the work he did between 1796 and 1801, namely his Lucinde (1799), his 
Athenaeum- and Lyceum-Fragments (1797-1801), his Charakteristiken of Lessing (1798) and 
Forster (1797), his Kritiken of Jacobi’s Woldemar (1796) and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister (1798), 
and his Gespräch über die Poesie (1800). In contrast to his later academic Vorlesungen and 
earlier writings on Classical literature, these texts have lways maintained a relevance for 
subsequent generations, and the ideas expressed therein are widely considered to be Schlegel’s 
unique contribution to modern literary theory14. Even today in the historiography of literary 
theory, one seldom finds any mention of Schlegel’s contributions to the discipline outside of 
what Walter Benjamin claimed in 1920 were the “Hauptquellen” for any exposition of Romantic 
literary criticism, at least for Friedrich Schlegel’s version of it; namely, “derjenigen 
Schlegelschen Arbeiten im ‘Lyceum’, ‘Athenäum’, [und] in den ‘Charakteristiken und Kritiken’ 
[…] welche unmittelbar den Begriff der Kunstkritik bestimmen” (Benjamin 13).  Generally 
speaking, scholarship on Schlegel within the field of Germanistik has tended to be concerned 
with this subject – Romantic literary theory – and with the corresponding works that Benjamin 
mentions.  
 In the 1960’s, due in large part to the publication of a wealth of previously unpublished 
material in the Kritische Ausgabe, one notices a new interest in previously underrepresented 
aspects of Schlegel’s career.  And if the rule before had been rather to focus on the “Romantic” 
Schlegel independent of his work before and after that phase, then one sees, as Raimund 
                                                
14 Helmut Schanze, in his summary of modern Schlegel-scholarship, says for example that Schlegel’s work on the 
theory of the novel is what has had the largest historical impact: “…gleichwohl kann immer noch der Beitrag 
Friedrich Schlegels zu[r] […] Konzeption und Programmatik des ‚Romans’ als eines universellen 






Belgardt wrote in 1967, “daß sich in neueren Arbeiten ein Schlegel-Bild abzeichnet, dem die von 
der älteren Forschung scharf durchgeführte Aufgliederung und Einteilung der geistigen Existenz 
Schlegels in eine frühe ‘klassische’ (bis 1796), eine mittlere ‘romantische’ und eine spätere 
‘katholische’ (1808 Übertritt zur kath. Kirche) Period weichen muß” (Belgardt 322)15.  But this 
new interest in emphasizing the continuities that span the various phases of Schlegel’s work 
should not be overemphasized.   In Belgardt’s study, as in the work of Richard Brinkman (1958) 
and Karl Polheim (1961) – two other scholars who place an emphasis on the study of continuities 
in Schlegel’s thought –, the primary aim is still the best possible understanding of Schlegel’s 
Romantic literary theory; they simply maintain that one cannot properly understand it without 
studying its genesis, that is, without studying his work on Greek and Roman literature.  If Walter 
Benjamin’s aim was “nicht das Werden seines [Schlegels, MB] Begriffs der Kunstkritik, sondern 
diesen selbst dar[zu]stell[en]” (Benjamin 13), then it is precisely this “Werden” that scholarship 
after 1960 turned increasingly towards16.  This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that a 1985 
collection of scholarship nominally dedicated to Schlegel’s Kunsttheorie put out by Helmut 
Schanze still includes, for the most part, texts that focus on Schlegel’s Romantische 
Dichtungstheorie.  Thus it is not so much the object of interest, but rather only the method of 
exposition, which has changed.  It should be clear, then, why one must be particularly wary 
                                                
15 Karl Konrad Polheim, writing in 1961, echoes a similar sentiment.  For him, newer Schlegel research, in contrast 
to pre-war scholarship, “fass[t] Friedrich Schlegel in seiner Gesamtheit auf, sie beton[t] die ungebrochene 
Kontinuität seiner geistigen Entwicklung, die organische Zusammengehörigkeit der einzelnen Phasen” (Polheim 
280) 
16 This is, for example, the perspective that Matthias Dannenberg (1993) takes in his study of Schlegel’s early (pre-
Romantic) literary-theoretical method as is evidenced in the title of the work itself: Schönheit des Lebens: eine 
Studie zum „Werden“ der Kritikkonzeption Friedrich Schlegels.  It is clear from the title that Dannenberg already 
starts from the premise that these early writings of Schlegel’s are to be understood as something inchoate, as in a 







while wading through the secondary research when the aim is – as in this study – to understand 
Friedrich Schlegel’s early literary-theoretical method, independent and irrespective of what he 
may have later gone on to do, when so much of the available scholarship, if it focuses on this 
early period at all, then very often still does so with one eye to the direction in which he was 
going.   In the section that follows, I will therefore give an overview of the available scholarship 
relevant for an understanding of Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay.  The essay has, in fact, made its 
way into some unexpected nooks and crannies of research, and it has, independent of Schlegel’s 
Romantic literary theory, and even independent of his other writings on Greek and Roman 
literature, had something of a life of its own.  
 
 
II.1 Reception of Schlegel’s Aristophanes-Essay in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries 
 
In one sense, Dierkes’ claim in 1980 that Friedrich Schlegel’s Cla sical studies had always 
been a “Stiefkind” in research is not entirely accurate (47).  They did actually enjoy genuine 
popularity during Schlegel’s own lifetime and for several decades aft rw rds.  In fact, they now 
carry the dubious honor of having lost their initial relevance in the field of Classical Studies 
(Altertumswissenschaft) only to gain increasing recognition within the field of German Studies. 






Sämtliche Werke in 1822, Schlegel could remark with pride in his Vorrede, that these writings 
had, despite their flaws, found a positive reception in Classical Studies in the interim17:  
 
Und wenn diese Arbeit, ihrer vielen Mängel ungeachtet, die bei solchen Gegenständen, 
und in diesem Alter kaum vermeidlich waren, dennoch von den ersten und 
bedeutendsten Gelehrten in dieser Wissenschaft der Altertumskunde günstig 
aufgenommen worden ist; so verdankt sie dies wohl dem Umstande, daß sie ganz nach 
dem einen rein künstlerischen Standpunkte entworfen, und daß dieser so streng darin 
durchgeführt worden (KAI 570).   
 
One of Schlegel’s primary objectives in these writings had, afterll, been philological in 
nature; he had been working towards the publication of the aforementioned two-volume work, 
Die Griechen und Römer, which would have constituted a comprehensive literary history of 
ancient Greece and Rome.   
A perusal of Volker Deubel’s 1973 Forschungbericht for Friedrich Schlegel shows, 
however, that in the 20th century, these writings were rarely discussed in Classical Studies except 
for perhaps in their obvious and limited role in the historiography of Classical literary studies in 
Europe.  Rather the vast majority of publications on Schlegel’s early work now come from the 
fields of Germanistik and philosophy, and are motivated by a desire not to better understand 
Classical literature, but rather to better understand the roots of Romantic literary theory, 
                                                
17 Behler indicates that among those who positively received Schlegel’s works could be counted F.A. Wolf, 
Christian Gottlob Heyne, Friedrich Creuzer and Alexander von Humboldt.  Humboldt wrote of Schlegel’s Classical 
studies in a letter to Varnhagen von Ense in 1833: “Ich habe sie fleißig studiert und mich überzeugt, daß viele 
Ansichten des hellenischen Altertums, die die Neuern sich zuschreiben, in Aufsätzen vor 1795 […] begraben liegen” 
(Behler KAI LXXIVf.).  [Humboldt quote taken from: Briefe von Alexander von Humboldt an Varnhagen von Ense, 
4. Aufl., New York 1860, pg. 10.]  Further Behler claims: “Charles Andler und René Wellek haben auf eine 
bestimmte Tradition der klassischen Altertumswissenchaft in Deutschland aufmerksam gemacht, die sich direkt 
von den Brüdern Schlegel, besonders von Friedrich Schlegel herleitet und Auswirkungen bis auf Friedrich Wilhelm 






particularly as an outgrowth and dialectical response to German Ide lism, and the historicization 
of philosophy at the turn of the 18th century18.   
 
 
II.2 Post-WWII Research Trends 
 
Post-war scholarship on Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay can be grouped und r four 
general categories, which differ from one another both in terms of methodological approach and 
in terms of their respective use of the essay19.   
1. The Aristophanes-essay often turns up in scholarship on Friedrich Schlegel’s 
early aesthetic philosophy, presenting as it does, a relatively concise illustration 
for the genre ‘Comedy’, of what he wished his general theory of literature to b .  
2. The essay is also mentioned in scholarship on Schlegel’s political philosophy.  
This is a limited field, since it is debatable in the first place whether Friedrich 
Schlegel even had anything like a coherent political philosophy.  But the 
Aristophanes-essay, in so far as it examines the reciprocal depen ncy of 
theatrical comedy and socio-political organization in Classical Athens, is relevant 
for any examination of Schlegel’s early political beliefs.  These two research 
                                                
18 See Volker Deubel’s “Die Friedrich Schlegel-Forschung 1945-1972” (1973). 
19 I choose the end of World War II as my dividing line in handling the relevant Schlegel-scholarship for tw  
reasons: first of all, there was a noticeable growth in scholarly interest in the Weimarer Klassik and in the Romantik 
after the war.  This coupled with the second reason – namely, that the complete works of Schlegel (Kritische 
Ausgabe) were published in 1958 bringing to light vast amounts of previously inaccessible material – led to a
renewed interest in Schlegel after the war, an interes  that tended – moreover – to look increasingly at Schlegel’s 






areas will be the main sources for the supplemental material that I will draw on to 
best understand Schlegel’s theory of comedy.   
3. Further, however, the essay is often read as a theoretical foundation for German 
Romantic Comedy. 
4. The essay also comes up in research in so far as it is relevant in the history of the 
reception of Aristophanes.   
The latter two research areas will only be discussed briefly, since they have only limited 
and tangential applicability for the purposes of the present study.   
 
 
II.2.1 Scholarship on Schlegel’s Early Aesthetic-Philosophical Method 
 
The primary focus of this thesis – the socially and politically predicated conditions of 
Schlegel’s theory of comedy – necessitates not only a formal understanding of the aesthetic 
theory of comedy Friedrich Schlegel develops in the Aristophanes-essay, but also an 
examination of his general beliefs in the interdependency of art and society at the time of its 
publication (1795).  It necessitates thus a sound understanding of Schlegel’s early philosophical 
and aesthetic attitude.  To be sure there is no dearth of literature that tackles this very question, 
but as mentioned above, often with the intention of better understanding his later thought. This 
is, for example, the case with Dierkes (1980), Behrens (1984), Schanze (1966), Michel (1982), 
Dannenberg (1993) and Mennemeier (1971), all of whom offer exhaustive accounts of 






aim at discovering the genesis of what became his Romantic literary theory.  Though each study 
is motivated by a slightly different question – Behrens and Dierkes ar  concerned with 
Schlegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie whereas Dannenberg and Michel trace the development of his 
closely related Kritikkonzeption – each extracts an overarching philosophical approach from 
Schlegel’s early corpus of publications, which each of Schlegel’s early writings in turn 
exemplifies to a greater or lesser degree.   Implicit in many of these studies is an attempt to 
situate Friedrich Schlegel’s proper place in the canon of German literary theory20.  Even when 
research focuses on Schlegel’s early (pre-Romantic) aesthetic project as an end in itself, it 
nevertheless attempts to cull from his overall writings on Greek and Roman literature their 
general underlying system21.  To my knowledge, there is no research that examines the 
Aristophanes-essay alone and attempts to extract from it that which it purports to offer, namely a 
serious theory of comedy.  Brummack’s chapter on Schlegel in Satirische Dichtung (1979) 
comes closest to a logically rigorous reconstruction of his theory of comedy, though here, 
Brummack’s objective is to pin down Schlegel’s peculiar attitude towards satire.  I engage with 
Brummack in chapter IV.5 of this study, as it will be seen that Schlegel’s understanding of satire 
yields certain fundamental implications with respect to his theory of comedy.   
Some scholars, for example Dannenberg and Behler, have alluded to the fact that the 
Aristophanes-essay constitutes the most realized encapsulation of Schlegel’s early method.  In 
                                                
20 Dierkes and Michel both dedicate entire chapters to the debate surrounding Schlegel’s proper place in the history 
of German literary theory; whether, for example, Schlegel belongs to the discipline of Aesthetic Theory, stretching 
from Kant and Hegel through to Benjamin and Adorno in the 20th century as, for example, Achim Geisenhanslüke 
holds in his Einführung in die Literaturtheorie (2006), or whether Schlegel is better understood as st nding within 
the modern tradition of Hermeneutik, beginning with his peer, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and running through 
Dilthey in the 19th century to Gadamer and Szondi in the 20th century, as Dierkes and Michel hold.  







limiting his scope to just comedy, he successfully realizes what he had only hoped to achieve for 
literature in general, namely, the development of a system of normative aesthetics that was 
grounded in the study of Greek literature.  Matthias Dannenberg, for example, claims that one 
finds in the Aristophanes-essay “so deutlich wie sonst nirgendwo in seinen frühen Arbeiten zur 
griechischen Antike […] [die Vermittlung] normative[r] und historisierend[er] Kunstreflexion, 
ästhetische[r] Theorie und geschichtliche[r] Kunsterfahrung […] miteinander” (Dannenberg 
159).  Ernst Behler expresses a similar opinion when he writes; “Wie sich der dichterische 
Gestaltungsprozeß konkret vollzieht, hat Schlegel in den Studien des Altertums besonders an 
zwei Autoren der griechischen Literaturgeschichte illustriert, an Homer und Aristophanes.” 
(Behler Einleitung CXXV).   
That little or no research addresses the Aristophanes-essay in its own right should come 
as no surprise, since Schlegel himself soon realized the extrem limitations of his theory, and it 
has been more than clear to subsequent generations that the “system” he sketches out is not only 
contradictory in parts, but also largely impractical22.  The followings study, however, aims at 
what amounts to a close reading of the Aristophanes-essay, an attempt o understand as best as 
possible, the theory of comedy laid out therein with recourse to as little else as possible.  
Schlegel saw the essay as a systematic attempt, though he soon abandoned any hopes at 




                                                






II.2.2 Scholarship on Schlegel’s Political Philosophy 
 
There are, it should be mentioned, a few post-WWII publications that seek to emphasize 
the political aspects of Schlegel’s early method.  Worth mentionig are studies by Wieland 
(1968), Hendrix (1962) and Beiser (1992).  All three of these studies fall victim to the impulse to 
make out of Schlegel a political thinker, and to emphasize rather too much his political writings.  
Though Schlegel undoubtedly nurtured a life-long interest in politics and political philosophy, 
even to the point of famously working later in life for Metternich, he was motivated above all 
throughout his life, irrespective of whatever intellectual project he undertook – be it political 
philosophy (Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus) or a philosophy of life (Philosophie 
des Lebens) – by artistic and aesthetic concerns. Even Heine, one of his sharpest critics, realized 
and praised this in Schlegel, writing in 1828:  
 
Die religiösen Privatmarotten, die Schlegels spätere Schriften durchkreuzen, und für die 
er allein zu schreiben wähnte, bilden doch nur das Zufällige, und namentlich i  den 
Vorlesungen über Literatur ist, vielleicht mehr, als er selbst es weiß, die Idee der Kunst 
noch immer der herrschende Mittelpunkt, der mit seinen goldenen Radien das ganze 
Buch umspinnt (Heine 484). 
 
Thus comments like Beiser’s, that for Schlegel “the aesthetic, moral, and intellectual 
standpoints are ultimately subordinate to a higher one that directs all of human Bildung”, namely 
the “political viewpoint” (Beiser 249), tend to distort Schlegel’s thought to prove a thesis23.  
Nevertheless, in so far as these texts seek to accentuate the v ry component of Schlegel’s 
                                                
23 Beiser also claims, for example, that “we can now see that Schlegel’s Romanticism was […] an attempt to address 






writings that is central to this study’s examination of his teory of comedy – that is to say, the 
political – they will be of assistance.   
 
 
II.2.3 Scholarship on the Relevance of Schlegel’s Essay for German Romantic Comedy 
 
Interestingly, the only branch of contemporary German Studies which as dealt 
exclusively with Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay, without seeing it simply as a subcomponent of 
his Classical writings in general, is that of German Romantic Comedy.  Previously an under-
researched facet of German Romanticism, it has emerged as a subject of study in its own right in 
the past few decades24.  Within the context of Romantic Comedy, Schlegel’s essay on 
Aristophanes is of relevance to the extent that its delineation of a theory of comedy lays the 
groundwork for an understanding of the formal aspects of Romantic Comedy.  Furthermore, 
from the perspective of literary history, the essay is of interes  in so far as it – particularly its 
enthusiastic reception of Aristophanes – paved the way for the literary climate that made the 
relatively experimental – and in some cases unstageable – comedies of Tieck, Brentano, Arnim 
and Eichendorff possible25.  However, while Schlegel’s essay may have been regarded as the 
“ locus classicus einer Theorie der romantischen Komödie” (Japp 17) in earlier studies – by 
Catholy (1982, 184-86), Kluge (1980, 186-88) and Holl (1923, 215), for example – Japp and 
                                                
24 Japp traces the reason for this under-representatio  in scholarship to the favoritism that Romantic literary theory 
itself shows for the novel over drama: “Aus sachlicher Perspektive kann […] angeführt werden, daß die romantische 
Poetik selbst den Roman – und nicht das Drama – in den Mittelpunkt ihrer Interessen gestellt habe” (Japp 1) 
25 These, according to Japp, are the canonical authors of Romantic Comedy.  Of questionable membership to this 






later scholars limit the relevance of Schlegel’s essay for the study of Romantic Comedy to its 
praise of Aristophanic stylistic devices, such as the parabasis, and Aristophanes’ literary satire26, 
devices which were later adopted by the Romantics27.  Japp draws parallels, for example, 
between Schlegel’s celebration of the parabasis – which, he claims, was novel for the time (Japp 
23) – and Tieck’s use of it in his comedies28.  Japp also sees the plays of Brentano, which he 
labels as “illudierend” under his typology, as embodying Schlegel’s normative appeal that 
schöne Komödie be devoid of “satirische Bitterkeit” (Japp 23f.).  Japp’s study marked a sea 
change in scholarship to a diminished use of Schlegel’s essay in the study of Romantic Comedy.  
Perhaps the most recent, and certainly the most definitive and comprehensive study of Romantic 
Comedy, Stefan Scherer’s Witzige Spielgemälde: Tieck und das Drama der Romantik (2003), 
only cursorily mentions the Aristophanes-essay in a footnote29.  In so far as the fundamental 
drive of this research area has been to assess the applicability of Schlegel’s essay to Romantic 
Comedy, the motive behind the use of Schlegel’s essay was to decipher the formal aspects of his 
theory of comedy, which could be applied to contemporary dramatic praxis.  Thus the contours 
of Schlegel’s philosophy of history and his philosophy of life (L bensphilosophie), which are 
                                                
26 The most famous example of this is Aristophanes’ satire of the language of Euripides and Aeschylus in The 
Frogs. 
27 During the Enlightenment, Aristophanes had been criticized for, among other things, the use of the parab sis, 
since it constituted a disruption of dramatic illusion.  For example, under “Comédie”, the Encyclopédie’s complaints 
of Aristophanes are that he was “qu'un comique grossier, rampant, & obscene ; sans goût, sans mœurs, san  
vraisemblance [my italics]”. 
28 For example, in Der gestiefelte Kater, characters step out of their roles and address the audience; for instance, 
Hanswurst: “Verzeihen Sie, wenn ich mich erkühne, ein Paar Worte vorzutragen, die eigentlich nicht zum Stücke 
gehören” (Tieck 147). 
29 Scherer claims, among other things, that Schlegel’s ssay has been “nur teilweise zu Recht […] von der 







necessary for an understanding of h w he arrived at his theory of comedy, were of no relevance 
to the projects of Japp, Scherer and Catholy.   
 
 
II.2.4 Scholarship on the Relevance of Schlegel’s Essay for the European, 
 Specifically German, Reception of Aristophanes 
 
  The last research area on Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay that is relevant for the purposes 
of the present study lies in the field of reception history.  Schlegel’s essay is of interest in this 
field in so far as it contributes to an understanding of the history of Aristophanes’ reception in 
Germany.  Interestingly, most of the Rezeptiongeschichten of Aristophanes in Germany were 
written during the time of the German Empire and the Weimar Republic30; many of these take a 
positivistic literary-historical approach, as is characteristic of the time period, and go no further 
than to simply provide a summary of Schlegel’s contribution to the Aristophanes-reception, and 
to accentuate the changes in general attitude towards Aristophanes’ plays, which he initiated.  
Perhaps due to structural and methodological shifts in German literary scholarship, no 
contemporary scholars, besides Martin Holtermann, have shown much interest in this aspect of 
Schlegel’s essay. However, Holtermann’s Der deutsche Aristophanes (2004) is of particular 
relevance here.  Though continuing the tradition of Aristophanes’ reception history, Holtermann 
deviates from his predecessors by focusing on the history of interest in specifically the political 
                                                
30 For example Süß, Aristophanes und die Nachwelt (1911); Hilsenbeck, Aristophanes und die deutsche Literatur 
des 18. Jahrhunderts (1908); Zelle, Die Beurteilung des Aristophanes im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (1900); Hille, 
Die deutsche Komödie unter der Einwirkung des Aristophanes (1907); Friedländer, “Aristophanes in Deutschland” 






content of Aristophanes’ plays31.  In limiting his inquiry, he thus emerges with a more nuanced – 
and less purely narrative – history of the German Aristophanes rec ption.  Of particular interest 
here will be Holtermann’s chapter on Schlegel, specifically its di cussion of Schlegel’s 


















                                                
31 Holtermann is clear about his objective in his introduction: “Ich möchte analysieren, wie das Interesse an den 






III Cultural Landscape: Prerequisites for a Proper  
Understandingof Schlegel’s Theory 
 
 
III.1 Relevant Intellectual Trends in Germany in the 1790s 
 
An understanding of the socio-political implications of Schlegel’s theory of comedy will 
necessitate a reconstruction of his argument as well as an examination of his early understanding 
of the reciprocal connections between art, society, politics and Bildung, and this will be the goal 
of the Chapters IV and V.  But it also requires, as with any text, hat one understand the wider 
historical context in which it was written.  Germany in the 1790s found itself in the midst of 
what, without exaggeration, could be termed a turning point in intellectua life, both literary and 
philosophical.  The Age of Enlightenment had flowered, and its program of the emancipation of 
man into a free agent and the rationalization of all aspects of society is a process that many 
acknowledge as still being in effect to this day.  At the same ti , the 1790s witnessed the first 
clear indications of a dialectical response to the Enlightenment.  Kant had definitively placed 
limits on the possible extent of human knowledge and understanding, the nasc nt German 
Romanticism of the late 1790s turned to literary themes, such as the fantastical, which seemed 
more to emphasize man’s irrationality than his rationality, and the terrible mutation of the French 
Revolution into, first a reign of terror, and then an absolute dictatorship, eemed to indicate that 
liberty, equality, and fraternity might necessarily remain unrealizable ideals.   
The 1790s also witnessed an incredible growth of interest in aesthetic p ilosophy in the 
German principalities, and Goethe’s plea that his contemporaries dedicate themselves more to 






peculiar prominence of investigations into the theoretical nature of literature during this time32.  
Interestingly, as Gerhard Schulz notes, aesthetics was, in fact, one of the last fields to be 
subjected to the Enlightenment fervour for reexamining the previously accepted truths and 
prejudices of classical authorities, and for subjecting systems and principles to rigorous 
analytical examination (Schulz 216).  For example, whereas the Enlightenment notion of a 
continuous progression of understanding had been recognized without hesitiation n the natural 
sciences, it was not until the late 18th century that Schlegel and his contemporaries began to 
believe in the infinite perfectibility of art as well.  Prior t  this, art and taste had been understood 
since classical antiquity as going through cycles that roughly mirrored the growth and decay of 
nations.  And even otherwise progressive thinkers like Diderot and Voltaire still held to this 
traditional belief.  Diderot, for example, famously postulated a “decree pronounced for all things 
in this world”, namely, “the decree which has condemned them to have teir birth, their time of 
vigour, their decrepitude, and their end”33, and Voltaire wrote in his Age of Louis XIV, first 
published in 1751, that the world had experienced only four cycles of birth, fruition, and decay in 
the arts, whereby the most recent one had occurred during the age of Louis XIV34.   
Not only did literary theory experience a sizeable growth during this time, however.  It 
also – and Schlegel’s early writings are examples of this – looked at literature from new 
                                                
32 Goethe to Eckermann, March 12, 1828: “Könnte man nur den Deutschen, nach dem Vorbilde der Engländer, 
weniger Philosophie und mehr Tatkraft, weniger Theorie und mehr Praxis beibringen” (Eckermann 668). 
33 Citation from Behler GRLT, 97. 
34 Voltaire: “Mais quiconque pense, et, ce qui est encore plus rare, quiconque a du goût, ne compte que quatre 
siècles dans l’histoire du monde.  Ces quatre âges heureux sont ceux où les arts ont été perfectionnés, et qui, servant 
d’époque à  la grandeur de l’esprit humain, sont l’exemple de la postérité” (Voltaire Siècle de Louis XIV 455).  
Notice Voltaire’s use of a supratemporal normative faculty, “goût”, whereby anyone possessing this sense of taste 
will clearly see that only these four ages came anywhere close to bringing the arts to a state of perfection.  That 
Voltaire is using the same standard of perfection for all four ages is indicated by the fact that Voltaire says that the 
Age of Louis XIV is “peut-être celui des quatre qui approche le plus de la perfection” (456).  Interestingly, Voltaire 






perspectives.  Schlegel’s writings, like those of many of his contemporaries, show a growing 
sense for the importance of historical context in the examination of art as well as an interest in 
the fundamental drives that could be said to be constitutive of human natureand made man 
receptive to art.  Furthermore, they show a shift in perspective from the traditional aesthetic 
approach of determining norms of literary form to an interest in the subjective reception of 
literature.  Lastly, there is an unmistakable programmatic undercurr nt in the writings of this 
period, an obsession with the role that art might play in society’s Bildung and an interest in the 
positive future of humanity. The roots of Schlegel’s philosophy of history and of his 
anthropological understanding of human nature will be discussed in more detail in subsequent 
sections (III.3 and IV.1).  In the two sections that follow, however, it is hoped that an 
examination of two historical events – the reaction to the French Revolution in Germany and the 
publication of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft in 1790 – will elucidate the reasons for the 
programmatic style of Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay, as well as the peculiarity of his aesthetical-
philosophical method, respectively.  
 
 
III.1.1 The Impact of the French Revolution on Schlegel’s Thought and Style 
 
The French Revolution was not received in the German-speaking world as it had been in 






lacked the necessary socio-political climate35.  Rather it was understood as a tangible 
culmination of Enlightenment ideas, proof positive of the materialistic effect that words could 
have36.  Kant’s enthusiasm for the French Revolution can be seen in many ways to typify this 
German attitude, which though it was quick to condemn the Revolution’s terrifying political 
consequences, nevertheless maintained its respect for the material potential it showed ideas to 
have.  For Kant, the Revolution’s significance lay not in its success or its failure but in its 
relevance for its pectators:  
 
Die Revolution […] mag gelingen oder scheitern; sie mag mit Elend und Greuelthaten 
[…] angefüllt sein […] –, diese Revolution, sage ich, findet doch in den Gemüthern 
aller Zuschauer […] eine Theilnehmung dem Wunsche nach, die nahe an Enthusiasmus 
grenzt. […] Wenn der bei dieser Begebenheit beabsichtigte Zweck auch jetzt nicht 
erreicht würde, […] so verliert jene philosophische Vorhersagung doch nichts von ihrer 
Kraft. – Denn jene Begebenheit ist zu groß, zu sehr mit dem Interesse d r Menschheit 
verwebt und ihrem Einflusse nach auf die Welt in allen ihren Theilen zu ausgebreitet, 
als daß sie nicht den Völkern bei irgend einer Veranlassung günstiger Umstände in 
Erinnerung gebracht und zu Wiederholung neuer Versuche dieser Art weckt werden 
sollte (Kant Erneute Frage 85, 88). 
 
Despite any contemporary atrocities caused by the Revolution and despite the threat of its 
ultimate failure, it could not, according to Kant, help but maintain its relevance as the realization 
of the philosophical prophecy that induced it.  For it confirmed, as Behrens writes, that 
“Geschichte selbst als machbar und planbar erfahren [werden kann]” (Behrens 13).  Precisely 
                                                
35 Indeed, the short-lived Mainz Republic (March – July, 1793) was the only political realization of revolutionary 
ideals on German soil during the age of the French Revolution.  
36 See, for example Behrens: “Die Französische Revolution wurde in Deutschland nicht als sozialer 
Emanzipationsprozeß, sondern überwiegend als moralisch-philosophische Umwälzung und Verwirklichung 
aufklärerisch-humanistischer Ideale verstanden” (Behrens 12).  Schulz expresses a similar sentiment: “Die meisten 
deutschen Intellektuellen der Zeit, die Schriftsteller, Gelehrten und Philosophen, haben die Revolution in ihren 
Anfängen als eine letzte Konsequenz aufklärerischen D kens betrachtet und begrüßt.  Sie bedeutete für sie eine 
Bestätigung der Erwartung; Denken und Schreiben könne die Welt nicht nur interpretieren, sondern sie auch 
verändern.  Diese Folgerung war für ein Land von besonderer Wichtigkeit, das seine politisch-ökonomische 






this is what Friedrich Schlegel took from the Revolution.  It informed his understanding of 
history and human progress more than it influenced his early political convictions.  For Schlegel, 
the Revolution was interesting from the historical perspective of its place in the progress of 
humanity.  This is clearly expressed in his 216th Athenaeum Fragment (1798):  
 
Die Französische Revoluzion, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, und Goethe’s Meister sind 
die grössten Tendenzen des Zeitalters.  Wer an dieser Zusammenstellung Anstoss 
nimmt, wem keine Revoluzion wichtig scheinen kann, die nicht laut und materiell ist, 
der hat sich noch nicht auf den hohen weiten Standpunkt der Geschichte der 
Menschheit erhoben (KAII 198).   
 
 
Schlegel uses an expanded definition of revolution. The actual material changes that the 
French Revolution may have caused are less relevant for him than its symbolic significance.  
From the perspective of human history – of human progress – intellectual vents can have as 
much revolutionary force as material ones.  It is the confidence that the French Revolution 
instilled in German intellectuals, the belief that their words could have material force, which 
lends much of the philosophy of the 1790s its programmatic flavor.  We see this, not only in 
Schlegel’s essay on Aristophanes, but indeed to a greater or lesser extent, in all of his early 
writings, and even more explicitly during his Romantic period.  His writings on Greek and 
Roman literature always show themselves to be peripherally concerned with the contemporary 
relevance that they can have37.  In Vom ästhetischen Werte der griechischen Komödie, Schlegel 
already reveals in the opening lines that he is not only concerned with understanding Greek 
comedy, as the essay’s title might lead one to think, but that he lso wants to show how that 
                                                
37 Helmut Schanze, among others, has referred to this aspect of Schlegel, namely “die systematische Vernetzung, ja 
Fundierung dieses Denkens in ‘seiner Zeit’” which he believes lends Schlegel’s work an “Aktualität […] für die 
‘Moderne’” (Schanze 3f.).  Thus it is Schlegel’s attempt to make his work on Classical literature contemporaneously 






understanding can illuminate the failures of contemporary comedy.  “Nichts ist seltner”, he 
writes, “als eine schöne Komödie.  Das komische Genie ist nicht mehr frei, es schämt sich seiner 
Fröhlichkeit, und fürchtet durch seine Kraft zu beleidigen” (KAI 19).   
His essay is not meant to be purely scholarly; it is also polemical.  Though Schlegel 
doubtless wanted to understand Greek Comedy to the best of his abilities, this was ultimately 
only secondary to the theory of comedy that he derived from it.  And this theory was not meant 
primarily as an analytical tool for interpretation, but much more as a blueprint for the future 
potential of comedy.  Schlegel’s ideal was that the Aristophanes-essay – and in fact all of his 
writings – be revolutionary in the same way that he felt that te French Revolution, Goethe’s 
Wilhelm Meister, and Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre had been.   
 
 
III.1.2 The Influence of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft on Schlegel’s Aesthtic Approach 
 
Like the French Revolution, the publication of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft marks 
another pivotal point in the formation of the German aesthetic climate of the 1790s.  But whereas 
the French Revolution’s influence was felt in nearly every field of German intellectual life, 
confirming intellectuals in their belief in progress and in the power of ideas, the influence of the 
Kritik der Urteilskraft was more limited in scope; its impact was felt largely in the field of 
aesthetics, but here it brought radical change.   In this section, I wish to show how Schlegel’s 
own aesthetic beliefs during the early period of his thought can be seen as both incorporating and 






In short, the Kritik  shifted the primary objective of aesthetic analysis from a pursuit of the 
normative rules for making and interpreting art – the proper content and form required for the 
attainment of beauty –, to an interest in its reception by the subject – an interest in how beauty is 
perceived.  To say that Kant’s Kritik did this alone would be to neglect a slow paradigm shift that 
had already begun during the Sturm und Drang period.  The growth of the Geniebewegung38, 
which was coupled closely with the first widespread positive reception of Shakespeare in 
Germany, led to a definitive structural shift away from the so-called French-influenced classicist 
Regelpoetik (the emulation of the authorities and adherence to traditional aesthetic/rhetorical 
rules) to a notion that both the work of art and its creator – the genius – are autonomous of any 
external or predetermined rules39.  Even Lessing, who in theory and praxis made a conscious 
effort to divorce himself from prevailing comedic and tragic norms (e.g. adherence to the 
Ständeklausel), did not advocate pure autonomy in art; his and his contemporaries’ dramas still 
wished to be bound to a purpose; they had a persuasive intent external to the play itself, namely, 
to compel their audiences to rational thought or – as Lessing believed in the case of the tragedy – 
to awaken their sense of compassion40.   
                                                
38 For more on the importance of the Genie-Ästhetik in this time period see, for example, Jochen Schmidt’s Die 
Geschichte des Genie-Gedankens 1750-1945, vol. 1: Von der Aufklärung bis zum Idealismus (1985). 
39 Evidence of this paradigm shift is found both in dramatic praxis and contemporary theory.  Many Sturm und 
Drang-dramas – for example Lenz’s Die Soldaten and Der Hofmeister and Goethe’s Götz – show the obvious 
influence of Shakespeare and few to none of the formalistic characteristics of the French classicist authorities, such 
as, for example, fidelity to the so-called drei Einheitenlehre, to the Ständeklausel and to Wahrscheinlichkeit.  
Theoretical support for art as autonomous – that is, without external purpose – was first given, according to Richard 
Newald (290), in 1786 by Karl Philipp Moritz, who described the sole-purpose of the work of art, in ths case plastic 
art, as being „in sich selbst vollendet “ (Mortiz Über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen 983). 
40 The former is more often seen as the intent of the so-called satirische Verlachkomödie of the Enlightenment, 
sometimes called the sächsische Typenkomödie ( .g. Lessing’s Der junge Gelehrte [1747]).  Scherer describes the 
external intent of these comedies as being the “Warnung vor den Fehlern normabweichenden Verhaltens; 
Überredung zu vernünftigem, lebenspraktischen Handeln; Belehrung durch satirische Demaskierung eines Fhlers 
als Torheit; dadurch moralische Besserung beim Zuschauer“ (Scherer Vorlesungen 5.5.1). The latter is associated 






The necessary consequence of this so-called Autonomie-Ästhetik, whereby an artist 
created – according to his own aesthetic principles – a work whose only purpose if any should 
be, as Kant wrote, an “interesseloses Wohlgefallen”, and as Moritz famously claimed, a 
“Vollendung in sich selbst ”, was that aesthetics could no longer concern itself with the correct 
formalistic qualities of the art-object (Kant KdU 204 §2; Moritz Über die bildende Nachahmung 
des Schönen 975).  Kant is explicit about the impossibility of deriving any objective rules for art:  
 
Genie ist das Talent (Naturgabe), welches der Kunst die Regel gibt. […] Die schöne 
Kunst ist nur als Produkt des Genies möglich.  Man sieht hieraus, daß Genie ein Talent 
sei, dasjenige, wozu sich keine bestimmte Regel geben läßt, hervorzubringen: nicht 
Geschicklichkeitsanlage zu dem, was nach irgendeiner Regel gelernt w den kann; 
folglich daß Originalität seine erste Eigenschaft sein müsse (Kant KdU 307 § 46). 
 
 
The philosopher, therefore, must not and cannot concern himself with the mechanism 
behind the creation of beauty, since for this, there can be no rational approach, and must 
therefore limit his study to the judgment of beauty.  Not objective beauty, but only its perception, 
can be critically conceptualized41.  Furthermore, since no formalistic norms for beauty can be 
logically determined, any claim to universality that the judgment of beauty can have is 
necessarily limited to the sphere of intersubjectivity42.  The judgment of beauty must be limited 
to the capacity of the community of recipients who, through debate and consensus, arrive at an 
                                                                                                                                                             
daß die ganze Kunst des tragischen Dichters auf die sichere Erregung und Dauer des einzigen Mitleidens geht, so 
sage ich nunmehr, die Bestimmung der Tragödie ist diese: sie soll unsere Fähigkeit, Mitleid zu fühlen, erweitern“ 
(Lessing 55).   
41 According to Schulz, this psychologization of aesth tics constitutes one of Kant’s most fundamental contributions 
to aesthetics in the 1790’s: “Man versteht den großen Einfluß Kants auf seine Zeit nicht, wenn man seine 
Philosophie nicht zugleich als Psychologie versteht.” (Schulz 216). 
42 Kant: “Aber von einer subjektiven Allgemeingültigkeit, d. i. der ästhetischen, die auf keinem Begriffe beruht, läßt 
sich nicht auf die logische schließen ; weil jene Art Urteile gar nicht auf das Objekt geht. Eben darum aber muß 
auch die ästhetische Allgemeinheit, die einem Urteile beigelegt wird, von besonderer Art sein, weil sich das Prädikat 
der Schönheit nicht mit dem Begriffe des Objekts, in seiner ganzen logischen Sphäre betrachtet, verknüpft, und doch 






aesthetic judgement.  In other words, it is not possible to develop rules, which might indicate 
how the artwork should be constructed or created.  Rather, one can only outline how a 
community of subjects might make an aesthetic judgment about the (art)-object. 
The radicalness of this conclusion and the depth of its impact in the German-speaking 
world cannot easily be overestimated.  The limit that Kant placed on the rational subject’s ability 
to know any sort of objective beauty is aptly characterized by Gerhard Schulz as “das erste große 
Fragezeichen” to the Enlightenment belief that the objective world could be systematically 
understood (Schulz 157).  And the so-called “Erkenntniskrise” that Kant inspired is one of the 
reasons why so many poets from this era felt driven to aesthetic philosophy in order to ground, as 
Schulz puts it, “ihre Kunst und ihr Handwerk theoretisch auf festen Boden”43 (ibid.).  At the 
time, few could approach aesthetics without first dealing with Kant’s Kritik , whether it was in 
the form of a complete incorporation of Kant’s ideas or, on the other hand, in an attempt to 
discredit them. 
In Friedrich Schlegel, we see both tendencies – incorporation and repudiation of Kant’s 
aesthetics – at work.  His interest in Kant dates back at least as early as 1793, that is, to his years 
as a law student, before he had yet decided to dedicate himself to pro essional writing.  In a letter 
to his brother August, from June 2, 1793 he writes: “Ich habe den Geist einiger großer Männer, 
vielleicht nicht ganz ohne Erfolg, zu ergründen gesucht als Kant, Klopstock, Göthe, 
                                                
43 Most famous among writers that Kant’s Kritik influenced is perhaps Schiller, who took a break from dramatic 
praxis after the publication of Don Carlos (1787) and – between 1792 and 1796 – wrote a series of aesthetic studies, 
all deeply informed by Kant’s Kritik .  Schulz summarizes this as follows: “Schiller hatstets die philosophische 
Grundlegung für seine literarische Arbeit als notwendig empfunden” (Schulz 218).  The central problem for Schiller 
was that he wished to ascribe a purpose to art, which would not however compromise its unconditional autonomy.  
To that end, his earlier formulation of the purpose of theater in his Mannheimer Rede (1784) as a “moralische 






Hemsterhuys, Spinoza, Schiller; anderer von weniger Bedeutung nicht zu erwähnen” (Let. to 
A.W. 6-2-1793)44.   
We see more explicit evidence, however, of Schlegel’s concern with the implications of 
Kant’s Kritik  from an unpublished fragment on aesthetics dating from 1795/96.  Here, he 
postulates an “allgemeingültige Wissenschaft des Schönen und der Kunst”, through which the 
“Kantische Theorie […] wiederleget [würde], nemlich die Behauptung, daß keine Theorie des 
Schönen möglich sey” (KA XVI 6).  The implication here is that Schlegel still believes in the 
objective validity of a theory of beauty.  This is, in fact, of central importance in understanding 
Schlegel’s early writings, that although they were all published after Kant’s three critiques, thus 
in the critical era, they still pursue traditional metaphysical – i.e. pre-critical – aims45.  This is 
why it makes sense for Schlegel to speak – as he does in the Aristophanes-essay – of  “die 
eigentliche Komödie” and “die Natur des Komischen” (KA I 20) as objects that can be pursued 
and described.  According to Dannenberg, Schlegel treats Ideas in their Platonic sense, as 
“metaphysische Wirklichkeiten, […] objektiv-konstitutive Prinzipien des Erkennens und 
Handeln” (Dannenberg 30)46.  This amounts to a rejection of one of the central principles of 
                                                
44 Schlegel’s remark is of added importance here in so far as it also shows his high regard for Hemsterhuis, whose 
influence is quite explicit in the essay on Aristophanes.  Hemsterhuis’ influence will be discussed in Chapter IV.1 in 
conjunction with Schlegel’s notion of the fundamental human drives and of freedom.  It is, in fact, remarkable that 
neither Behrens (1984) nor Dierkes (1980) mentions the influence of Hemsterhuis on the young Schlegel in their 
otherwise expansive treatments of Schlegel’s early critical method.  
45 Dannenberg sees this as being a neglected aspect in studies on Schlegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie.  Dannenberg: 
“Gerade diese Tatsache findet in denjenigen Untersuchungen zu F. Schlegels Frühwerk, die ihre Darstellung erst mit 
dem Studium-Aufsatz beginnen […] oftmals zu wenig Berücksichtigung” (30).  
46 In fact, the influence of Plato’s dialogues on the young Schlegel has not escaped attention (see, for example: 
Behler, Friedrich Schlegels Theorie der Universalpoesie, 221). Schlegel himself was clear about the influence Plato 
had had on him in his youth. In his later Vorlesungen on the Philosophie des Lebens (1827) he writes, “es sind jetzt 
eben neununddreißig Jahre, seit ich die sämtlichen Schriften des Plato in griechischer Sprache zum ersten Mal mit 
unbeschreiblicher Wißbegierde durchlas; und seither st, neben mancherlei andern wissenschaftlichen Studien, diese 






Kant’s Kritik .  However, though Schlegel may have believed that his comedic ideal actu lly 
existed in some metaphysical sense, he was also fully aware that it was an ideal, and as such, 
may remain forever unrealized.  Like the Platonic form however, Schlegel’s comedic ideal, 
whether it has a metaphysical existence or is just a theoretical construct, nevertheless has a 
practical relevance as an abstraction against which existing comedies may be compared.   
Schlegel’s essay on Aristophanes does, however, show an incorporation of Ka t’s Kritik  
to the extent that one sees there the same shift in perspective away from an examination of the 
formalistic aspects of art to a study of its reception.  Schlegel’s essay concerns itself very little 
with the actual structure of Aristophanes’ plays, and whenever structure is alluded to, it is only to 
show in which ways this structure is symptomatic of the socio-hist rical context within which 
Greek Comedy developed.  His theory, as I will show in Chapter V, examines the ideal effect 
that comedy should induce in the individual.  Any play that induces this peculiar effect is a 
comedy, and its aesthetic worth is in direct proportion to the degree to which it induces this 
effect or serves its purpose, regardless of what formal aspects it may or  not have.   
 
 
III.2 Programmatics in Schlegel’s Essay on Aristophanes 
 
In the review of secondary research (Chapter II), I alluded to the fact that, at the time of 
its publication, Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay enjoyed a positive reception in its own right, and 
not merely within the field of Classical Studies.  Ernst Behler writes that during the early 19th 






KAI CXLIII).  This is no small honor considering the fame and success – at least in the 
intellectual community – that Schlegel would garner with his later writings.  The essay’s fame 
derived not so much from the theory of comedy it contained, but rather from the way in which 
Schlegel used his theory both as a programmatic defense of Aristophanes as a canonical 
playwright, and at the same time, as a polemical attack on what he felt was the sad state of 
contemporary German comedy.  The following section examines the historical background 
underlying the polemical war that Schlegel here wages, which will, in turn, make it clear why 
Schlegel felt that a new comedic ideal – his ideal – was so necessary.   
 Schlegel begins his short essay with the bold claim that Old Greek Comedies – 
particularly those of Aristophanes – represent the purest realization of the comedic ideal and this 
is, in fact, the premise from which his argument develops.  This was, in 1794, far from an 
obvious truth.  Aristophanes’ plays had fallen into disrepute in the 17th and 18th centuries.  And 
in preparing for the republication of the Aristophanes-essay in his Sämtliche Werke (1822), 
Schlegel remarked in a footnote on the impact that his essay had had in the turn towards a more 
positive reception of Aristophanes in the early 19th century: 
 
Daß Aristophanes […] als ein Urkünstler […] neben den erhabensten Meistern der 
alten tragischen Kunst seine Stelle einnehme und verdiene; das war dam ls, als dieser 
kleine Aufsatz […] zuerst erschien, noch durchaus nicht so allgemein anerkannt, als 
dieses jetzt überall zu vernehmen ist (KAI 19). 
 
 
It was not only, as we might today assume, Aristophanes’ sexual licentiousness and 
Europe’s later prudishness, which led to a natural condemnation of the playwright.  The reasons 






characters as with the perceived influence of his plays in the sentencing of Socrates.  Martin 
Holtermann, in his reception-history of Aristophanes, writes that Aristophanes was generally 
dismissed in France in the 17th and 18th centuries, “gerade auch von Interpreten, die ansonsten 
die antike Literatur für vorbildlich erklärten” (Holtermann 55f.).  Holtermann gives three reasons 
for this trend:   
1. Aristophanes’ language was criticized for its perceived “Unordnung” and “Vulgarität”.  
2. His plays were criticized from the viewpoint of the hegemonic dramatic Regelpoetik.  
According to critics who argued along this line, Aristophanes violated the classical 
unities of time, action, and place and failed to bring his plays “zu einer befriedigenden 
Abrundung”.   
3. Aristophanes’ satire of public and political contemporaries was a dramatic mechanism 
that was inapplicable within the context of 17th and 18th century France, and ran counter 
to the literary tastes of a people writing for a court audience, where overt political 
criticism was out of the question (Holtermann 54f.).   
Aristophanes was criticized, thus, from a normative aesthetic standpoint for not adhering to 
the rules of dramatic art and from a moral standpoint for both his perceiv d moral degeneracy 
and for his personal satires, which one critic termed “que des libelles diffamatoires” 
(D’Aubignac 81)47.  It is possible that Friedrich Schlegel, when he calls the worth f 
Aristophanes’ plays “allgemein verkannt” (KAI 20), would have traced the reasons for this 
misjudgment back to the same place that his brother August Wilhelm did in his 1808 lectures 
Über dramatische Kunst und Literatur, namely back to Voltaire: 
                                                







Mit dem erbarmungswürdigen Uebermuthe der Unwissenheit urtheilt Voltaire […] über 
Aristophanes ab, und die neueren französischen Kritiker sind meistens sei em 
Beyspiele gefolgt.  Uebrigens kann man die Grundlage aller schiefen Urtheile der 
Neueren hierüber, und die verstockte prosaische Ansicht schon beym Plutarch in seiner 
Vergleichung des Aristophanes und Menander finden (A.W. Schlegel 127). 
 
The sweeping condemnation to which A.W. Schlegel here refers can be found in the 
following widely-cited passage from Voltaire’s entry for ‘Athéisme’ in his Dictionnaire 
Philosophique (1764): 
 
Ce poète comique [Aristophanes, MB], qui n’est ni comique ni poète, n’aurait pas été 
admis parmi nous à donner ses farces à la foire Saint-Laurent; il me paraît beaucoup 
plus bas et plus méprisable que Plutarque ne le dépeint (Voltaire Dictionnaire 
Philosophique 469) 48. 
 
Voltaire, in turn, is referring here to Plutarch’s Comparison between Aristophanes and 
Menander, in which his extreme devaluation of Aristophanes is accompanied by ffusive praise 
for Menander.  Among other things, Plutarch criticizes Aristophanes for his “coarseness […] in 
words, vulgarity, and ribaldry”, a playwright to be enjoyed only by the “rude and vulgar person” 
(Plutarch 463), and for having a style with such great “varieties and dissonances in it, so neither 
doth he give to his persons what is fitting and proper to each” (Plutarch 467).  As was the case 
with Shakespeare, so too did Voltaire’s condemnation of Aristophanes help delay the possibility 
for an unbiased examination of his art on the continent.  Characteristi of the criticism from 
                                                
48 Voltaire’s judgment of Aristophanes is in the section on atheism because it was important for him to sh w who he 
believed was really responsible for the unjust charge against Socrates that he was an atheist.  According to Voltaire, 
Aristophanes (specifically, because of his play The Clouds, in which he casts Socrates as a money-minded sophist) 
is to blame above all others: “La mort de Socrate es  c  que l’histoire de la Grèce a de plus odieux. […] Aristophane 
fut le premier qui accoutuma les Athéniens à regarder Socrate comme un athée. […] Voilà l’homme qui prépa a de 






Voltaire and other French writers is the fact that it condemns Aristophanes from the perspective 
of the normative aesthetics of the 18th century – what in Germany was termed the Regelpoetik49 – 
and that it shows an inability or a refusal to understand Aristophanes from within the context of 
the time in which he was writing.   
Precisely this is what Friedrich Schlegel wished to rectify in his essay on Aristophanes, and 
he did so in a radical manner50.  He does not just advocate a relativistic understanding of 
Aristophanes by which he, like all writers, would be judged only against contemporary aesthetic 
standards.  Indeed, the Aristophanes-essay is meant to outline a theory of comedy and as such is 
every bit as normative as the Regelpoetik it attacks. Schlegel, at least at this time in the 
development of his thought, believed that Old Greek Comedy was a necessary and sufficient 
subject from which to develop a comedic theory. According to him, an understanding of “die 
Natur des Komischen” could only be acquired from its purest examples and this, for him, meant 
comedies that were devoid of “tragische Energie” or, to use Schlegel’s anthropological 
terminology, bereft of any traces of Schmerz (KAI 20).  And the only comedic genre that, for 
him, met this standard, was Old Greek Comedy, precisely because of it  independence from any 
                                                
49 For a detailed discussion of what was understood as the dramatic Regelpoetik in Germany in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, see: Manfred Fuhrmann. “Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Tragödienpoetik in Deutschland”, particularly 
pgs. 93-96.  Fuhrmann traces the roots of the Regelpoetik back to Aristotles’ Poetics and to Horace’s Ars Poetica.  
Apart from the aforementioned ‘Mißachtung der Einhet des Ortes’, Aristophanes would have been criticized, 
according to the Regelpoetik and its famous Dreieinheiten-Lehre, for failing to match the correct cast of characters 
with the correct genre.  According to the R gelpoetik, gods and generals, who are often in Aristophanes’ comedies 
(e.g. Cleon in The Knights and Dionysus in The Frogs), belong to “die erhabene Sphäre […] der Tragödie” and were 
considered unsuitable subjects for comedy (Fuhrmann 93).   
50 It should be mentioned here that Friedrich Schlegel was not actually the first in Germany to praise Aristophanes’ 
worth in response to French criticism.  This honor g es to Johann George Sulzer and Christoph Martin Wieland.  
Sulzer, in his Allgemeine Theorie (1777) expresses an opinion that is very similar to Schlegel’s statement that “das 
komische Genie […] nicht mehr frei [ist]” (KAI 19).  Sulzer writes: “es wäre vielleicht nicht übertrieben, wenn man 
sagte: daß in einer einzigen von seinen Comödien, mhr Wiz und Laune ist als man auf den meisten neuer Bühne 
in einem ganzen Jahr hört” (Sulzer 215).  Wieland held lectures on Aristophanes in Erfurt at the beginning of the 






reliance on tragic elements.  The opening lines of Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay constitute a 
polemical attack on the traditional understanding of comedy and hint at the radical novelty 
behind Schlegel’s theory: 
 
Das komische Genie ist nicht mehr frei, es schämt sich seiner Fröhlichkeit, und fürchtet 
durch seine Kraft zu beleidigen.  Es erzeugt daher kein vollständiges und reines Werk 
aus sich selbst, sondern begnügt sich, ernsthafte dramatische Handlungen aus dem 
häuslichen Leben mit seinen Reizen zu schmücken.  Aber damit hört die eigentliche 
Komödie auf; komische Energie wird unvermeidlich durch tragische Energie ersetzt: 
und es entsteht eine neue Gattung, eine Mischung des komischen und des tragischen 
Drama. […] Die Natur des Komischen kann man nur in der unvermischten reinen 
Gattung kennen lernen: und nichts entspricht so ganz dem Ideal des reinen Komischen, 
als die alte Griechische Komödie.  Sie ist eins der wichtigsten Dokumente für die 
Theorie der Kunst; denn in der ganzen Geschichte der Kunst sind ihre Sc önheiten 
einzig, und vielleicht eben deswegen allgemein verkannt (KAI 20f.). 
 
Schlegel calls for nothing short of a complete reappraisal of Old Greek Comedy.  The 
implications here are far-reaching.  Likely, never before and never since has anyone tried to 
develop a full and systematic theory of comedy from the work of a single playwright, and 
certainly not from Aristophanes.  Further, according to Schlegel, th re is little to nothing that 
came after Aristophanes, which could be called true comedy.  The infer nce to be drawn is that 
those works, which according to previous critics were usually classified as comedies – works by 
Plautus and Terence, or Molière and Shakespeare – were, for Schlegel, nothing of the sort, but 
were better thought of as mixed forms, “Mischung[en] des komischen und des tragischen 
Drama” (ibid.). 
 That the system of classification for the genre “Comedy” itself was in need of reworking 
must have been obvious to many by the 1790s, and in this respect, Schlegel’s attack, however 






during the High Enlightenment (1740s and 1750s) had engaged in a sort of theoretical 
gymnastics in trying to apply the inherited genre-dichotomy “Tragedy/Comedy” to plays that 
seemed to fit neither type.  The outcome tended rather to expand the definition of comedy than 
that of tragedy.  Tragedy had, after all, been clearly defined by Aristotle in the Poetics whereas 
the section on comedy had famously gone missing. Profitlich accurately describes the dillemna 
in which “Kunstrichter” from this time period found themselves:  
 
Die nur begrenzte Erlaubnis, aus dem System der etablierten Genres auszubrechen und 
neue Formen, z.B. die für das klassizistische Denken suspekten Mischformen, zu 
kreieren, erklärt den Eifer, mit dem eine große Zahl von Kunstrichtern v.a. der vierziger 
und fünfziger Jahre die Frage erörtert, ob zu den ‘Komödien’ Dramen gezählt werden 
können, die ihre Protagonisten […] statt Lachanreize zu bieten, Empfindungen, 
Teilnahme, Mitleiden, Rührung erregen (Profitlich 35)51.  
 
The catalyst for this theoretical debate, one that actually considered removing the element of 
humor and its effect – laughter – from the definition of comedy, was above all the freshly 
imported and increasingly popular comédie larmoyante from France (in Germany das rührende 
Lustspiel), and the difficulty it posed for the traditional tragedy/comedy dichotomy.  According 
to Gottsched, the rührende Lustspiel depicted “das bürgerliche Leben der heutigen Welt” 
(Gottsched 593f.)52, and though it tended to be sentimental and moving, it did not however end 
tragically53.  Its eschewal of traditional tragic elements (noble or divine personnel, tragic ending) 
                                                
51 Profitlich writes that Adam Daniel Richter and – of all people – Johann Elias Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s uncle, 
went furthest in theorizing humor completely out of c medy (Profitlich 35-37). 
52 This citation is from Gottsched’s “Zufällige Gedanke  über Herrn Adam Daniel Richter”.  The reference is taken 
from Profitlich (35). 
53 For a more in depth clarification of the sub-genre ‘Rührendes Lustspiel’, see the Reallexikon’s entry.  There, it is 
thus defined: “Das Rührende Lustspiel konstituiert sich als eine ‘Komödie ohne Komik’ […].  Wirkungsästhe ischer 
Zweck des Rührenden Lustspiels ist es, daß die Zuscha er mittels Identifikation vom traurigen, aber nicht tragischen 






led to its classification as a comedy (Lustspiel) despite the absence of any intended laughter-
effect54.   
Friedrich Schlegel starts from a completely different – nearly opposite – premise from 
these theorists of the High Enlightenment.  Instead of widening the definition of comedy beyond 
recognition, Schlegel substantially limits it and transforms it into an ideal, which only 
Aristophanes has come anywhere close to achieving.  This is why Sc legel labels Old Greek 
Comedy “eins der wichtigsten Dokumente für die Theorie der Kunst” (KAI 20).  He is careful 
not to ascribe absolute perfection to it, writing instead: “nichts en pricht so ganz dem Ideal des 
reinen Komischen, als die alte Griechische Komödie” (ibid.).  As for contemporary comedy, 
Schlegel has nothing nice to say.  Without a doubt, when Schlegel says of contemporary 
dramatic praxis, “es schämt sich seiner Fröhlichkeit, und fürchtet durch seine Kraft zu 
beleidigen”, the types of drama that he has in mind are the rühr nde Lustspiel and the so-called 
Familienstücke which followed in its wake and had become ubiquitous to the point of triviality 
by the 1790s55.  The scorn that Goethe, Schiller, and the Romantics had for the imm nsely 
popular Familienstücke of succesful playwrights like Iffland and Kotzebue has been well 
documented56.  According to Eckehard Catholy, Schlegel’s contemporaries would have easily
picked up on the essay’s veiled polemics against these types of drama:  
 
                                                
54 One need look no further than Christian Fürchtegott Gellert’s Die zärtlichen Schwestern (1747) for proof of how 
unfunny comedies were becoming.  The play is essentially a bürgerliches Trauerspiel with a happy ending 
(marriage, as one might expect).  It exemplifies the ypical structure of the rührende Lustspiel: “Tugend und 
Ernsthaftigkeit auf der Bühne, statt tragischem Scheitern ein glückliches Ende; Erbauung und Rührung im Parkett, 
statt Schrecken und Erschütterung gerührte Erleichtrung” (Reallexikon ‘Rührendes Lustspiel’ 338).   
55 The Familienstück is also sometimes termed the Familiengemälde (Schulz 467). 






Die Spitze, die sich hier gegen Schlegels erfolgreiche Zeitgenossen Iffland und 
Kotzebue richtet, ist unübersehbar, auch wenn deren Namen in einer Untersuchung, die 
der Komödie einer längst vergangenen Zeit gewidmet ist, nicht ausdrücklich erwähnt 
werden.  Die gebildeten Leser der ‘Berlinischen Monatsschrift’, in der Schlegel seinen 
Essay publiziert hatte, mußten die geheime Beziehung erkennen (Catholy 186). 
 
One of the essays intentions is that the new sense that Schlegel gives to the comedy might 
help free contemporary drama of these popular Familiengemälde and Rührstücke.  According to 
Holtermann, Schlegel’s intention was “dem Lustspiel seiner Gegenwart neue Möglichkeiten 
auf[zuzeigen].  Für Komödien in Anlehnung an Aristophanes war damit der Zwang zum 
geschlossenen Drama aufgehoben und breiter Raum für Formexperimente gebot n” (Holtermann 
95).    
 
 
III.3 Schlegel’s Early Critical-Historical Project:  
Implications for the Aristophanes-Essay 
 
 
As I mentioned in the preceding section, Schlegel believed Old Greek Comedy to be a 
necessary and sufficient object of study for the development of a theory of comedy. Because of 
the peculiar socio-political structure of Athens, comedy achieved, according to Schlegel, a state 
of comedic aesthetic perfection, or as Schlegel puts it purity, that had not since been matched.  
Accordingly, he believed that any theory concerned with the essence of comedy woul  do well to 
begin there.  Before I examine the reasons that Schlegel gives in the essay on Aristophanes for 
ascribing such excellence to Old Greek Comedy in particular, I find it constructive to briefly 






his high praise for Greek comedy is not peculiar, but rather exemplative of his general attitude 
towards Greek literature.   
Nearly all of Schlegel’s early writings on Classical literature, even those on quite specific 
topics – like Über die Diotima – were written with one eye towards his planned critical-historical 
project of developing a system of aesthetics out of the history of Classical literature.  And the 
Aristophanes-essay is supported by the implicit assumption that a eory of comedy, and indeed 
any adequate theory of literature, must necessarily begin with the history of its genesis, which 
Schlegel traced to the Greeks.  Both Hans Dierkes and Klaus Behrens, who have written detailed 
studies of Schlegel’s early aesthetic-philosophical method, emphasize this historical approach as 
being one of the central principles of his early theoretical attemps57.  It is an interest that he 
shared with many of his contemporaries; German intellectual thought in the late 18th century saw 
the awakening of a more nuanced understanding of history, and practically all of Schlegel’s 
literary peers, but most famously Herder, tried to deal with what they felt was the importance of 
understanding the progression of history58.  In Germany, writes Schulz, “leistete Herder auf 
diesem Gebiet in seinen Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit grundlegende 
Arbeit” (Schulz 181).  Herder’s response to the traditional pursuit of supratemporal norms that 
could apply equally to artworks from different historical eras was to emphasize instead the 
relative historical context in which each artwork was produced.  In this manner, writes Dierkes, 
                                                
57 Behrens, for example, calls Geschichtsphilosophie Schlegel’s “hermeneutisches Werkzeug” (Behrens 29).  
Dierkes entire study of Friedrich Schegel’s early method is based on the assumption that it can best be understood as 
rooted in a philosophy of history (Dierkes 11-12). 
58 Schulz, in his history of late 18th and early 19th century German literature, sees the awakening of a new historical 
consciousness in Germany as being one of the main cultural-intellectual trends that characterize this era (Schulz 
180).  In the section that he dedicates to this ‘tendency’, Schulz lists a virtual who’s-who of late 18th century German 






Herder was able to arrive at “eine Lösung des von der ‘Querelle’ überkommenen Problems eines 
universalen Geschichtsmaßstabes” (Dierkes 16).  The contours of Herder’s argumentation cannot 
be discussed here.  Suffice it to say that Schlegel’s own Geschichtsphilosophie can be seen in 
many ways as a reaction to what he saw as Herder’s historical relativism.  Much as Schlegel 
considered his own work in aesthetics to be a response to the limitations that Kant had placed on 
the possibility for an objective theory of beauty, his Geschichtsphilosophie both incorporated 
Herder’s sense for the importance of historical context while at the same time dismissing its 
relativistic conclusions.  In a review of Herder’s Briefen zur Beförderung der Humanität, 
Schlegel makes his criticism of pure historical relativism clear:  
 
Die Methode […], jede Blume der Kunst, ohne Würdigung, nur nach Ort, Zeit und Art 
zu betrachten, würde am Ende auf kein andres Resultat führen, als daß lles sein müßte, 
was es ist und war” (KAII 54). 
 
 
For Schlegel, supratemporal aesthetic norms were still possible.  Th ir determination 
simply required a far more nuanced understanding of historical context than his predecessors had 
given them.  They could no longer simply be the traditional norms of the Reg lpoetik, but needed 
instead to take into account the society, Schlegel might say the societal Bildung, that had helped 
to make possible the production of a given work of art.  And as we will later see, the theory of 
comedy that Schlegel developed is more concerned with the socio-polit cal context that frames 
Aristophanes’ plays than the plays themselves59. Schlegel’s belief that it was precisely the 
                                                
59 It is noteworthy that Schlegel so often makes reference to the “alte Griechische Komödie” and far less often 
mentions Aristophanes by name, even though Aristophanes’ plays are the only full examples of Old Greek Comedy 
that we now possess.  Schlegel wishes to derive his theory of comedy more from the practice of Old Greek Comedy 
than from Aristophanes’ plays in particular.  Aristophanes’ dramatic structure, his use – for example – of the 






Greeks whose literature might form the basis for a universal theory of literature followed from 
two assumptions: first, that the Greeks invented Epik, Lyrik, and Dramatik, and second, that 
under the Greeks, these genres developed naturally.  This naturalness is, for Schlegel, one of the 
key characteristics of Classical (and specifically Greek) literature, and is one of the principle 
things that separates it from modern literature.  In his early w itings, he offers various 
formulations of this central belief, calling the progression of Classical literature “[ein] ganze[r] 
Kreislauf der organischen Entwicklung der Kunst” (KAI 307-08), or alternately “[eine] 
allgemeine Naturgeschichte der Dichtkunst; eine vollkommene und gesetzb nde Anschauung” 
(KAI 276).  Elsewhere he describes it as “ein Maximum und Kanon der natürlichen Poesie” 
(KAI 307), “das Urbild der Kunst und des Geschmacks” (KAI 287-88), and  “das Höchste, was 
im Systeme des Kreislaufes möglich war, ein Maximum der natürlichen Bildung: also ein 
relatives Maximum” (KAI 634).  For Schlegel, the Greeks were unique in that they had no 
literary models outside of their own with which they could compare themselves.  Modern 
literature, on the other hand, is often characterized by Schlegel as künstlich.  He claims that, 
under the conditions of modernity, “Absicht das Prinzip der menschlichen Bildung ist”, as 
opposed to the “freie Natur” that characterized the Greeks and their literature (KAI 29).  This is 
why Schlegel sometimes traces the birth of modernity to Socrates who, he believes, was the first 
thinker “welcher […] den Versuch wagte, Sitten und Staat den Ideen der rein n Vernunft gemäß 
                                                                                                                                                             
audience, these stylistic devices are not in themselve  valuable, but only in so far as they are sympto s of the 
“schöne Fröhlichkeit” and the “erhabne Freiheit” (KAI 24) that Schlegel believed were, and should be, th  actual 







einzurichten” (KAI 636).  Plato’s dialogues, he believes, could be considered the first canonical 
texts of modernity60.   
Another assumption that one sees as running through all the various formulations of 
Greek literature cited above is that Schlegel viewed its progression as a Kreisl uf.  It represented, 
for Schlegel, a complete and closed cycle spanning from birth, to ma urity, and finally to its 
death.  And though it was up to Schlegel’s time rather paradigmatic to see literature as going 
through cycles of growth and decay, for Schlegel, only Greek literature could be characterized as 
a “System des Kreislaufs” (KAI 631).  On the other hand, modern literature, by which Schlegel 
meant post-Classical literature, was because of its reflectivity progressive in nature.  We can see 
in this early dichotomy, which Schlegel draws between acient and modern literature, an inchoate 
form of what he would later term the Classical and the Romantic61.  These, he believed, could be 
                                                
60 The belief that the age of reflectivity began with Socrates and Plato is not peculiar to Schlegel.  George Sabine, 
writing on an altogether different topic (the history of political philosophy), expresses a sentiment that is quite 
similar to Schlegel’s, and he sees the socio-historical impetus for the writings of Plato, which Schlegel believed 
embodied the reflectivity of modernity, as being Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War.  “The great age of 
Athenian public life”, writes Sabine, “fell in the third quarter of the fifth century B.C., while the great age of […] 
philosophy came only after the downfall of Athens i her struggle with Sparta.  Here, as in so many cases in history, 
reflection followed achievement, and principles were abstractly stated only after they had long been acted upon” 
(Sabine 21).  The Greeks he writes, “probably would not have turned to philosophy, at least in the manner they did, 
had the life of Athens remained as happy and as prope us as it seemed to be when Pericles’s Funeral Oration 
struck its dominant note” (Sabine 35).  Greek litera u e’s naturalness, Schiller called it its naivité, was thus one of its 
most essential qualities.   
61 Schlegel was certainly not the first to draw comparisons between ancient and modern literature.  The famous 
Querelle des anciens et des modernes which began in the late 17th century and was fought largely in France and 
England started from a similar point of inquiry and was well-known by Schlegel’s time. What was novel about the 
Schlegel brothers, however, was that they approached the interpretive distinction between Ancient and Modern – or 
alternately Classical and Romantic – with a more nuanced historical understanding.  The brothers argued in the 
wake of what Schulz calls the growing “Geschichtsbild der Aufklärung, in dem jeder Kultur und jeder Epoche ihr 
eigenes Recht innerhalb des Fortschreitens der Menschheit zugestanden wurde” (Schulz 60).  Thus their 
comparisons of the Classical and Romantic were concerned with understanding the historical necessity of th se 
styles as reflections of their social, theological, even political contexts, and though Friedrich Schlege  believed, at 
least during his early phase, that artworks could be judged according to an ideal, this ideal was far removed from 
idealizations of literary form, and tended rather to be an ideal of beauty.  And if ancients approached t is ideal 
within the various genres that they created, then the moderns, because of their peculiar historical condition, 






distinguished from one another not only temporally, but also formalisticaly, that is to say, by 
genre.  For example, whereas Epik, Lyrik, and Dramatik are classical genres, modernity is 
characterized by mixed genres: the tragicomedy, which Schlegel and his brother believed was 
best exemplified by Shakespeare, and the novel, which Schlegel saw as the modern literary genre 
par excellence, having the ability to incorporate all other genres, thus represnting the universal 
mixed-form.    
In opposition to the notion of Greek literature as a fully realized Kreislauf, Schlegel 
repeatedly characterizes modern literature as in a state of progression, as “ewig nur werden, nie 
vollendet” (Behler Einleitung CIX).  This is most succinctly put when he famously writes that 
modern – or Romantic – literature is a “progressive Universalpoesie” (KAII 182 [Fragment 
116]).  Schlegel arrived at this understanding of modernity after he began turning his focus to 
modern literature in 179562 and used Condorcet’s mathematical notion of infinite perfectibility63 
as a way to characterize modern literature as being in a state of infinite progress.    
Since, for Schlegel, the essence of modern literature is its mixing of genres, and the fact 
that it is – in an Enlightenment sense – a progressive project whi h can never be completed, it ill 
lends itself as a basis for the development of an aesthetic sysem which wishes to identify the 
                                                                                                                                                             
find worth in both ancient and modern literature; they were, according to him, doing different things.  Perhaps the 
most comprehensive definition of how the Schlegel brothers understood the Classical/Romantic distinctio  can be 
found in the first of A.W. Schlegel’s lectures Über dramatische Kunst und Literatur (1808). 
62 Schlegel began engaging in intense studies of Lessing, Forster, Jacobi’s Woldemar, and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister 
in 1795 (Behler Selbstzeugnisse 48). 
63 Schlegel terms this characteristic of modern literature as “d[ie] unendliche Fortschreitung” (KAI 631).  Condorcet, 
in his Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, which Schlegel reviewed in the summer 
1795, applied the notion of infinite perfectibility from infinitesimal calculus to the Enlightenment notion of the 
progress of humanity, thereby finding a scientific, thus unassailable, defense of progress.  Condorcet: “The 
perfectibility of man is truly indefinite: and […] the progress of this perfectibility, from now onwards independent 
of any power that might wish to halt it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has cast 
us” (Condorcet 3).  For more on the Condorcet-Schlegel connection, see Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory 






essence or ideal of the various genres, as it was Schlegel’s int nt to do.  In fact, we can take his 
claim – “die Natur des Komischen kann man nur in der unvermischten Gattung kennen lernen” 
(KAI 20) –, and say that this is what he ultimately wished to o for all literary genres.  Ideally, 
Schlegel would have developed an aesthetic system explaining the ideal comical, the ideal 
tragical, the ideal lyrical etc.  It is indicative of the influence that Kant had in turning aesthetic 
philosophy away from the pursuit of developing ideal norms for literary forms, that Schlegel 
does not characterize his own project as the pursuit of the ideal comedy, but rather of “das 
Komische”.  And, in fact, the theoretical paradigm in the early and mid 19th century was rather to 
concern oneself with the comical and the tragical, as it were, and not primarily the comedy and 
the tragedy64.  The ambitious nature of Schlegel’s project makes it understandable why he was 
never able to finish it.  But in his theory of comedy, one finds perhaps the most fully realized 
subsystem of what he had envisioned as a universal system, whose description he never 
completed.   
                                                
64 A perusal of Profitlich’s two-volume collection ofGerman dramatic theory from the Baroque to the 20th century 
shows that, beginning in the 1790’s, theorists begin to concern themselves less with die Komödie and die Tragödie 
and rather more with das Komische and das Tragische.  This is most apparent in the dramatic theories of Schlegel, 
Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. Szondi, in his Essay on the Tragic, speaks of the aesthetic pursuit of the tragic 
as opposed to the tragedy as beginning with Schelling.  I was, unfortunately, unable to obtain a copy of the German 
original.  Szondi writes: “Since Aristotle, there has been a poetics of tragedy.  Only since Schelling has there been a 
philosophy of the tragic.  […] Aristotle’s text strives to determine the elements of tragic art; its object is tragedy, not 
the idea of tragedy. […] The realizations it thereby achieves […] are meaningful not in themselves, but rather in 
their significance for tragic poetry, whose laws are to be derived from them” (Szondi Tragic 1).  However, already 
in Schlegel, we see a definitive turn away from viewing the dramatic form as the primary end.  What a comedy’s 
form and content should be is left completely open.  Schlegel does not yet, however, take the radical step that 
Schelling does and this is precisely the point for Szondi.  Schelling’s aesthetics go so far that they eschew any 
concern for the drama (the tragedy) whatsoever, not o ly in its form, but also in its effect and social function: “By 
no longer focusing on the effect that the tragic has on the audience but on the phenomenon of the tragic itself, 
[Schelling] commences the history of the theory of the tragic” (Szondi Tragic 7).  On the other hand, Schlegel’s 
anthropological approach in aesthetics, as we will see, still necessitates that his primary concern be precisely the 
play’s – or more specifically beauty’s – effect on its audience.  What separates Schlegel from his Enlightenment 
predecessors (particularly Lessing) who likewise argued from the perspective of dramatic effect, is fir t of all, that 
Schlegel sees art as bringing the individual’s disparate fundamental drives into harmony, whereas Lessing saw art as 
having a rationalizing social-didactic function, and second of all, that Schlegel, like his contemporaries (Schiller, 






IV Towards Schlegel’s Theory of Comedy as  
         Argued in his Essay on Aristophanes 
 
 
As I stated in the introduction, the aim of the present study is to arrive at an 
understanding of the socially predicated components of Schlegel’s theory of comedy.  To that 
end, the present chapter focuses on retracing Schlegel’s line of argumentation in order to gain an 
accurate and logically sound understanding of his theory of comedy.  It is my intention that, in 
approaching Schlegel’s essay thus, that is, via a close reading, we will be able to see to what 
extent his notion of comedy rests on his understanding of the socio-historical context out of 
which it arises.  Illustrating this dependence will, I hope, make it clear why the normative 
component of his theory of comedy itself presupposes certain normative beliefs as regards what 
is proper for society.   
Given his eschewel of literary theories grounded in formalistic norms, Schlegel’s essay 
on Greek Comedy does not begin with a description of Aristophanes’ plays.  Rather, his theory 
develops from an anthropological premise.  His strategy is to start by outlining what he believes 
to be the fundamental characteristics of human nature that make the individual receptive to 
comedy.  And from there, he hopes to show that classical Athenian society and the comedy 
which arose out of it, allowed for this receptivity to be realized. If in his early writings, Friedrich 
Schlegel treats Geschichtsphilosophie as a tool for understanding how literature and culture 
develop over time as a reflection of the historical context out of which they arise, then 
anthropology – what Schlegel calls Lebensphilosophie – is, for him, what grounds literature and 
beauty as supratemporal human necessities, manifesting themselves through all eras, in greater or 










IV.1 Anthropological Basis: The Concept of “Freude” 
 
Schlegel begins his argument by giving an explanation of the dialectical interplay between 
two basic human drives – Freude and Schmerz – which he believes are activated by and 
represented in art.  Only later in the essay does it become clear how these drives relate 
specifically to comedy.  As I hope to show, a close examination of the concepts of Freude, and 
to a lesser degree Schmerz, as they are used in this essay are of importance, not only because 
they underlie Schlegel’s theory of comedy, but also since they form, as Brummack writes, 
“ein[en] Grundbegriff in der Anthropologie des frühen Schlegel”, and thus help make sense of 
the social function Schlegel believes art to have as a necessity of human nature (Brummack 14).  
The entire passage on the concepts Freude and Schmerz is given below as it forms the basis for 
the analysis that follows: 
 
Die Freude ist an sich gut, auch die sinnlichste enthält einen unmittelbaren Genuß 
höhern menschlichen Daseins.  Sie ist der eigentümliche, natürliche und ursprüngliche 
Zustand der höhern Natur des Menschen; der Schmerz erreicht ihn nur durch den 
geringeren Teil seines Wesens.  Rein-sittlicher Schmerz ist nichts als entbehrte Freude, 
und rein-sinnliche Freude nichts als gestillter Schmerz; denn der Grund des tierischen 
Daseins ist Schmerz.  Aber Beides sind nur Begriffe; in der Wirklichkeit, bilden beide 
heterogene Naturen in durchgängiger Gemeinschaft ein Ganzes – den Menschen, 
verschmelzen in einen Trieb – den menschlichen; der Schmerz wird sittlich, und die 







Schlegel presents two interpretive dichotomies that elucidate what he considers to be the 
difference between animal and human nature:  
1. Sittlichkeit/Sinnlichkeit, and 
2. Freude/Schmerz   
Whereas the term Sinnlichkeit is relatively straightforward – sensuality seems a sufficient 
translation – Sittlichkeit is rather more difficult.  The meaning it assumed in German philosophy 
during the late 18th and early 19th centuries is different, though related to, the translation that is 
conventionally given – morality.  The way that Schlegel uses the term seems to accord with the 
various definitions for Sittlichkeit that Grimm’s Wörterbuch cites Schlegel’s contemporaries as 
giving; namely the human capacity to act according to the intellec , as opposed to the purely 
instinctive reaction that arises out of sensual stimulation65.  Whereas all sentient beings are per 
definition sinnlich, only humans are sittlich.   
While the same animal/human distinction can be made for Freude and Schmerz – Freude is, 
according to Schlegel, purely human – it is not at first clear what exactly these terms indicate, or 
rather, how they should be treated.  According to their conventional meanings, one would think 
of Freude (joy) as purely an emotion and of Schmerz (pain/sorrow) as, in one sense, a sensory 
experience, and in another, an emotion.  And Schlegel does indicate that, for him, Schmerz 
originates in the senses, since he writes: “der Schmerz erreicht ihn [den Menschen, MB] nur 
durch den geringeren Teil seines Wesens” (KAI 21).  He also acknowledges that in humans as 
opposed to in animals, Schmerz can take on a more emotional or ‘sittlichen’  character, in which 
                                                
65 This formulation is taken from various definitions and examples from Schlegel’s contemporaries, which Grimm’s 
Wörterbuch gives.  For example, Schiller is cited as writing, “Sittlichkeit ist Bestimmung durch reine Vernunft”, and 
according to Kant, “Übereinstimmung einer Handlung mit der Form des r. (reinen) Willens ist Sittlichkeit’’ (Grimm 






case it develops into something like sorrow or suffering.  Freude, on the other hand, is for 
Schlegel an essential and distinguishing quality of human nature.  Morethan simply an emotion, 
it is, as he writes, “der eigentümliche, natürliche und ursprüngliche Zustand der höhern Natur des 
Menschen” (ibid.).  It is important to note that Schlegel emphasizes the fact th t he is treating 
Freude and Schmerz as idealized human drives.  Their separation from each other occurs nly at 
the conceptual level; they are “nur Begriffe”, as he says (ibid.).  In fact, in a later edition of the 
essay (1822), Schlegel changed the original sentence, “Aber Beides sin  nur Begriffe” to “Aber 
Beides sind nur Begriffe der Absonderung”, which seems to indicate mor firmly that they are to 
be taken as practical constructs66. “In der Wirklichkeit”, as he writes, “bilden beide heterogene 
Naturen in durchgängiger Gemeinschaft ein Ganzes – den Menschen, verschmelzen in einen 
Trieb – den menschlichen” (ibid.).  Both drives must be thought of as working simultaneously in 
man.  That Schlegel was adamant about the inseparability of human drives – that is, that they 
only represent idealized constructs – is evident if we look at an early unpublished sketch on 
aesthetics by him.  There he writes: “Das Thier und der Geist sind so vereinigt, daß die 
Gemeinschaft ihrer Triebe absolut ist; ein innigerer gegenseitiger Einfluß ist nicht denkbar” 
(KAXVI 27).   
Matthias Dannenberg claims that Schlegel’s pronouncements in the Aristophanes-essay and 
elsewhere in his early writings on human nature are part of a general intellectual current in the 
18th century, which sought to discover man’s purpose through an examination of his essential 
qualities.  Above all Plato, François Hemsterhuis (himself a Platonist), Schiller, and Ernst Platner 
                                                
66 Interestingly, in a letter to his brother from 1793, Schlegel defines “die strenge Absonderung” as “nur Werk des 
Verstandes” (KAXXIII 142).  Thus, critical thought is for Schlegel something that categorizes and separates but 






are, for the young Schlegel, “Anknüpfungspunkte für eine Wiederaufnahme traditionell-
metaphysischer Fragestellungen” (Dannenberg 26f.).  Characteristi  of this attitude is an 
understanding of man as a dualistic being, representative of both animalistic and divine 
tendencies.  Hemsterhuis famously understood this as man’s amphibian nature, which man 
adopted after his fall from grace (Hemsterhuis 279).  And Ernst Platner, expressing a similar 
sentiment, calls man “weder Körper noch Seele allein”, but rather “di  Harmonie von beyden” 
(Platner XV)67.  Both of these formulations share with Schlegel the attempt to explain human 
nature by way of its perceived differentiation from animal nature.  And all three describe this 
difference by way of an unempirical metaphysical appeal; for Hemsterhuis, it is man’s divinity, 
for Platner his ‘Seele’ and for Schlegel his ‘higher nature’. 
We might best arrive at an understanding of what Schlegel means by Schmerz – and from 
there approach Freude – by examining Hemsterhuis’ dialogue Alexis, in which one finds a 
definition of man that is parallel in structure, though somewhat different in content from 
Schlegel’s.   According to Diokles, Alexis’ mentor and interlocutor, animals are completely 
motivated by displeasure arising from want and their sole purpose is to alleviate it.  
 
Also ist die Begierde, die erste Sensation, die in der tierischen Natur entsteht, aus der 
Empfindung eines Bedürfnisses und der eines Gegenstandes, der dies Bedürfnis 
befriedigen könnte, zusammengesetzt; und folglich ist vor dem Genuß die Beg rde 
eine Unlust (Hemsterhuis 231f.).   
 
Schlegel echoes this sentiment when he writes in the Aristophanes-essay: “Der Grund des 
thierischen Daseins ist Schmerz” (KAI 21).  Animals experience only Schmerz and its alleviation 
                                                
67 That Schlegel was acquainted with Hemsterhuis’ philosophy is evidenced by the already-cited letter to his brother 
from 1793.  In the same letter, he mentions Ernst Platner as one of the authors of “weniger Bedeutung”, which he 






or avoidance; in other words, they are beings that vacillate between Schmerz and Nichtschmerz.  
For Diokles, what distuingishes humans from animals is man’s capacity for freedom, though in 
his view, most humans do not in reality actualize this capacity.  “Es [gibt] wenig freie Menschen, 
[….] und eigentlich [ist] nur der Weise frei” (Hemsterhuis 236).  Hemsterhuis here echoes the 
characteristic Enlightenment sentiment that humans free themselves through the proper use of 
their distinctive intellectual capacity.  Importantly, the concept of Freude plays no role in 
Hemsterhuis’ dialogue.  For him the relevant distinction is between th  necessity of animal pain 
and the freedom of human wisdom.  For Schlegel, however, who is tailoring his anthropology in 
his Aristophanes-essay to an ultimate determination of comedy, Freude, and not wisdom, is the 
leading theoretical concept68.  Neverthless both make the claim that though animals are bound by 
necessity, those characteristics or drives that are distinctly human – for Hemsterhuis wisdom, and 
for Schlegel Freude – do not exist as a matter of course in humans, but rather as a potentiality, 
the active realization of which makes one human.  For both Schlegel and Hemsterhuis, the 
question of human nature is inseparable from the question of the human purpose.  Freude is not, 
according to Schlegel, a purely sensory emotion, i.e. not merely pleasure, and thus is not to be 
confused with Freud’s understanding of the pleasure-principle as the psychological desire to 
increase one’s pleasure69.  Rather for Schlegel, Freude is, as Brummack indicates, both an 
                                                
68 I draw the conclusion that Schlegel tailors his beliefs on human nature in this essay to their relevance for comedy 
because I have not found any mention of the concept of Freude anywhere else in his writings.  The implication that I 
draw is that Freude is, in Schlegel’s view, not the main distinguishing characteristic of humans, as Hemsterhuis 
treats wisdom, but rather that it is perhaps one of many.   
69 In fact, Freud’s pleasure-principle is only the negative formulation of Schlegel’s definition of the animal as a 
being that seeks to alleviate its (natural) Schmerz and thus would not apply in the least to humans as Schlegel 
understands them. See for example, Freud’s definition of the pleasure-principle: “Wir glauben, daß [der Ablauf der 
seelischen Vorgänge] jedesmal durch eine unlustvolle Spannung angeregt wird und dann eine solche Richtung 
einschlägt, daß sein Endergebnis mit einer Herabsetzung dieser Spannung, also mit einer Vermeidung von Unlust 






anthropological and an ethical concept70; after all, as Schlegel writes, Freude is “an sich gut” 
(KAI 20).  Later in the same essay, Schlegel writes that Freude is “ein Symbol des Guten” (KAI 
21).  Schlegel’s use of the word ‘Symbol’ is of central importance. In the 1822 edition of the 
essay, Schlegel clarified by writing instead of simply “ein Symbol des Guten”, “ein Symbol oder 
die sinnbildliche äußere Erscheinung des Guten [my italics]”.  Freude, much like Hemsterhuis’ 
freedom, is an ideal.  It can only exist purely as an idea, as  symbol.  According to Schlegel, 
Freude in its pure form can only be depicted and beheld; it can only be glimpsed in its pure form 
as a “sinnbildliche äußere Erscheinung”.  This is where the role of comedy comes into play for 
Schlegel.  Specifically, comedy is precisely this symbol of Freude.  Under Schlegel’s theory, 
comedy’s essential element is that it is a symbol of man’s capacity for pure joy.  As Schlegel 
writes a few lines later, “mit der Hoffnung ungehinderter Vereinigung, scheint die letzte Hülle 
der Tierheit zu verschwinden; der Mensch errät den völligen Genuß, nach wel hem er nur 
streben kann ohne ihn zu besitzen” (KAI 22).  Thus, in the aesthetic depiction of pure Freude, 
which Schlegel believes the Old Greek Comedy came closest to achieving, we appear to be 
finally successful in our aspiration to divorce ourselves from our animal nature.   
In a letter to his brother, August Wilhelm, dating from October 16, 1793, we see an 
inchoate formulation of the more nuanced anthropological aesthetics laid down in the 
Aristophanes-essay.  Specifically one notices the same desire to pin down man’s “Bestimmung” 
and to transfer those findings into an aesthetic reflection about what gives the “Dichter” and the 
“Gedicht” their “Werth”:   
 
                                                







Die Richtung auf Gott und der Genuß Gottes ist […] nicht unsre ganze Bestimmung, 
aber unsre höchste.  Ein Mensch hat so viel Werth als Daseyn, d.h. als Leben, Kraft und 
Gott in ihm ist.  Hat er aber auch viel Kraft und Leben, sind diese aber im Streite mit 
dem Gott in ihm, so wird er immer ein häßlicher Mensch, ein verächtlicher Dichter, und 
sein Urtheil schief seyn. – Dieser Maaßstab gilt auch für einzelne menschliche Werke; 
also ein Gedicht z.B. hat so viel Werth als menschliche Lebenskraft darin ist.  Dazu 
gehört aber auch die Richtung aller Theile auf das höchste Ziel; und was anders ist 
Sittlichkeit? (Let. to A.W. 10-16-1793). 
 
There is a striking similarity between Schlegel’s description in the Aristophanes-essay of 
Freude as an expression of “höher[es] menschliche[s] Dasein” and his definition in the citation 
above for man’s “höchste[r] Bestimmung” as “die Richtung auf Gott und der Genuß Gottes”.  
Both the experience of Freude and the act of gravitating towards God are, as Schlegel puts it, our
highest, though “nicht unsre ganze Bestimmung”.  This early formulation highlights the latent 
use in the Aristophanes-essay of what Dannenberg characterizes as “der Topos von der 
Verähnlichung des Menschen mit Gott” (Dannenberg 26)71. In other writings it is more explicit, 
as, for example, in a letter to August Wilhelm dating from August 28, 1793 where Schlegel 
states: “Unsre Würde [ist] Gott ähnlich zu werden” (Let. to A.W. 8-28-1793).  It is interesting to 
note that, for Schlegel, when the individual exhibits a disharmonious combination of “Kraft und 
Leben” with “dem Gott in ihm”, this results in das Häßliche, i. e. in an insult not to goodness, 
but to beauty; it is aesthetically displeasing.  
                                                
71 This is a topos, which Dannenberg dates back at leas as early as Plato, who – it has already been mention d – was 
one of Schlegel’s favorite authors, and if we look at an excerpt from a dialogue from Plato’s Middle Period – the 
Theaetetus – we see a formulation of man as a corrupted reflection of the gods which is similar to Schlegel’s own 
formulation in the above-excerpted letter.  In Theaetetus, Socrates is explaining to his interlocutor, Theodor s, that 
evil, “having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity […] hover[s] around the mortal nature, and this 
earthly sphere”.  And he continues, “wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and 
to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and 






An understanding of the concept of Freude and its relation to art is easier if we recast it in 
the more explicitly theological terminology that Schlegel’s uses in the above-cited letters.  His 
comments are not religious; they might even be construed as atheistic.  Rather, it is only 
theological symbolism that he uses. He transfers the traditionally theological/mythological72 
metaphor of man as a being, hovering between completely unreflective animalness and 
omniscient and benevolent divinity, to a normative aesthetic one of man strivi g, through art, to 
approximate his divinity.  This theological symbolism is generally not very overt in the 
Aristophanes-essay but is nevertheless unmistakable when Schlegel writes: “In dem Höchsten, 
was er fassen kann, erscheint dem Menschen das Unbedingt-Höchste; seine höchste Freude ist 
ihm ein Bild von dem Genuss des unendlichen Wesens” (KAI 22).  Thus, in Schlegel’s view, the 
realization of Freude is a postive goal, approached in the comedic act. 
Ernst Behler, in a short biography of Schlegel meant for popular consumption, gives one 
of the most detailed accounts of what beauty means for the early Sch egel.  Its anthropological 
foundation is unmistakable.  I’ll include here the excerpt in near entirety, first of all because it is 
perhaps one of the best elucidations of what the concept of Schönheit means for Schlegel, but 
also because it is closely related to the concept of Freude, since Freude is the primary 
component, for Schlegel, that determines a comedy’s aesthetic beauty: 
 
Schönheit ist für ihn [Schlegel, MB] das Resultat einer glücklichen Harmonisierung von 
zwei antagonistischen Trieben in der menschlichen Brust, von denen der eine in 
ungeschmälerter Natur verharren möchte, während der andere danach strebt, die Natur 
zu überwinden und die eigentlich menschliche Sphäre als ein Reich bloßer Kultur oder 
Kunst zu errichten.  Schönheit ist, mit anderen Worten, das Resultat einer ästh tischen 
Erziehung, welche den tief eingewurzelten Dualismus des Menschen zur Versöhnung 
                                                
72 I use both terms (theological and mythological) here because the metaphor is found throughout both Greek and 






bringt.  Dieser besteht darin, daß wir als geistige Lebewesen aus zwei verschiedenen 
Naturen zusammengesetzt sind – aus Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft, aus Trieb und Geist, 
Rezeptivität und Spontaneität, Notwendigkeit und Freiheit, Tierheit und Menschheit 
(Behler Selbstzeugnisse 34).   
 
As Schlegel writes in the Aristophanes-essay, “Leben und Geist sind unzertrennlich” in 
man (KAI 21); thus the aesthetic goal is not the subsumption of Leben to Geist or vice versa, but 
rather, as Behler puts it, the “Harmonisierung” of both “in der menschlichen Brust”.  Further, 
Behler points out the normative Bildungskonzept latent in Schlegel’s understanding of Schönheit.  
If Schönheit results in a harmonization of the natural and cultural spheres, then art’s effect is to 
bring about a conciliation of this inherent dualism, a mediation, which results in beauty.  For 
Schlegel, art cultivates a mediation between, as Behler puts it, one’s “Sinnlichkeit” and one’s 
“Vernunft”. The notion of Schönheit here is social.  Pure beauty may be represented in the art 
object itself, but it is only experienced, and thus only gains validity, as an approximation in the 
individual.  This occurs as a product of the right sort of Bildung, and Bildung – that is cultivation 
– only makes sense as a social phenomenon.  The artistic phenomen is thus dialectical; its 
success depends on the art object and on a person’s or a society’s ability to experience or 
appreciate the object.  In the case of comedy – as reflected in the Aristophanes-essay –, the 
realization of beauty is a function of the comedy itself as a symbol of Freude and of a society’s 
capacity for Freude.  Schlegel calls for “eine Bildung des Menschen durch Freiheit und Natur 
[…], wo alle seine Kräfte ihrem freien Spiel und ihrer eignen Etwicklung ungehemmt 
überlassen sind”.  And he continues that once this is achieved, “dann wird der Mensch, seine 
Bildung und seine Geschichte, ein gemeinschaftliches Resultat seiner beiden heterogenen 






freedom means for Schlegel, how it relates to comedy and the concpt of Freude, and how 
Schlegel believes it is best achieved. 
 
 
IV.2 ‘Inner’ Freedom in Man and in Dramatic Form as  
Prerequisites for the Experience of Freude 
 
After discussing the anthropological basis for the concept of Freude, and postulating it as 
“der höchste Gegenstand der schönen Kunst” (KAI 22), i.e. comedy73, Schlegel turns to a 
discussion of how Freude is to be treated both in its relation to comedy and to comedy’s 
audience.  He does this by way of discussing Freude’s essential qualities.  In short, he claims: 
“Schöne Freude muß frei sein, unbedingt frei.  Auch die kleinste Beschränkung raubt der Freude 
ihre hohe Bedeutung, und damit ihre Schönheit” (KAI 22).  Freedom is thus the necessary 
precondition par excellence for the attainment of “schöne Freude”; if Freude is subjected to 
limitations in any way, it is necessarily hindered: “Zwang der Freude ist immer häßlich, ein Bild 
der Vernichtung und der Schlechtheit” (ibid.).  Schlegel follows by describing what he means by 
freedom and he gives both a moral-anthropological and a social-political definition of the term.  
Freedom is achieved, per definition, “durch das Hinwegnehmen aller Schranken”: 
  
Eine Person also, die sich bloß durch ihren eignen Willen bestimmt, und die es offenbar 
macht, daß sie weder innern noch äußern Schranken unterworfen ist, stellt die 
vollkommne innre und äußre persönliche Freiheit dar.  Dadurch daß sie im frohen 
Genusse ihrer selbst nur aus reiner Willkür und Laune handelt, absichtlich ohne Grund 
oder wider Gründe, wird die innre Freiheit sichtbar; die äußre in dem Mutwillen, mit 
                                                






dem sie äußre Schranken verletzt, während das Gesetz großmütig seinem Rechte 
entsagt (KAI 23). 
 
There is an aspect of this conception of freedom that is wholly in keeping with the 
Enlightenment notion of freedom.  It is hard to overlook the similarity between Schlegel’s 
formulation that freedom means “sich bloß durch [den] eignen Willen [zu] bestimm[en]” and 
Kant’s famous definition that Enlightenment means having the freedom and courage to use one’s 
own reason74.  In both we see the realization of freedom as being not only a passive but also an 
active process, as being something that cannot only be granted and protected, but must also be 
actively willed.  Schlegel makes the distinction between inner ad outer freedom; Kant calls it 
“geistlicher” and “bürgerlicher” freedom (Kant Beantwortung 41).  However, whereas Kant’s 
spiritual freedom has more to do with the instrumentalization of one’s capacity for rational 
thought – the awakening from “Unmündigkeit” (Kant Beantwortung 35), as it were –, Schlegel’s 
definition of inner freedom is tailored to its relevance for comedy.  It is depicted in the person, 
“dadurch daß sie im frohen Genusse ihrer selbst nur aus reiner Willkür und Laune handelt, 
absichtlich ohne Grund oder wider Gründe”.  Thus Schlegel’s freedom is far more anarchical 
than Kant’s, and it is anathema to rationality, which must always necessarily be motivated by a 
purpose.  Schlegel’s inner freedom is not only without purpose; it is against purpose.  It is the 
freedom to act purely arbitrarily, and to enjoy doing so.  Only with this sort of freedom can 
Freude be attained, or at least strived after.  
Just as Schlegel first defines Freude as an anthropological function of human nature and 
then transfers the concept to its symbolic depiction in art, so too does he first describe freedom in 
                                                
74 “Sapere Aude! Habe Muth dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedien n! ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung. 






the personal sense, and then hint at what this implies for the art object. It should be mentioned, 
however, that many of Schlegel’s explanations leave something to be desired, and it is difficult 
not to agree with Dannenberg that Schlegel’s definitions of the terms Freude and Freiheit come 
off in places as somewhat “verschwommen” rather than “klar und deutlich” (Dannenberg 166).  
For example, Schlegel avoids citing many concrete examples from Aristophanes’ plays, which 
would have made some of the most confusing aspects of his distinctions learer.  Nevertheless, 
to the extent that Schlegel discusses how previous critics misjudged Aristophanes’ dramatic 
form, he implicitly hints at those formalistic aspects of Aristophanes’ plays, which are indicative 
of the Freude and Freiheit that he is referring to.  “[Man] wirft […] dem Aristophanes vor: seine 
Stücke seien ohne dramatischen Zusammenhang und Einheit, seine Darstellungen in Karikatur 
und unwahr, er unterbreche oft die Täuschung” (KAI 30).  These are the familiar Enlightenment 
criticisms of Aristophanes.  He was disparaged for failing to adhere to one of the central 
principles of the Regelpoetik that drama be believable, that it have vraisemblence, as the French 
called it and that the cultivation and maintenance of dramatic illusion (Täuschung) be pursued.  
Maintaining dramatic illusion was, after all, one of the principle motivations behind the so-called 
Lehre von den drei Einheiten, according to which the ideal play was to take place in one setting, 
ideally last as long as the staging itself but no longer than 24 hours, and have a unified plot with 
beginning, middle and end (Einheit von Ort, Zeit und Handlung).  These unities were thought to 
be requisite for maintaining dramatic illusion.  For Schlegel, however, th se stipulations are too 
constricting for comedy, and constitute in his terminology the very “Schranken” that must be 
removed if pure Freude, and consequently pure comedy, is to be achieved.  If, as Schlegel says, 






life-affirming action, then the same holds true for what he believ s is true comedy.  It cannot be 
subject to dramatic norms.  For him, the breaking of traditional dramatic norms “ist nicht 
Ungeschicklichkeit, sondern besonnener Mutwille, überschäumende Lebensfülle, und tut oft gar 
keine üble Wirkung, erhöht sie vielmehr” (KAI 30).  Thus the formal mnifestation of comedic 
freedom is complete purposelessness.  Furthermore, the plot has no responsibility to truth in its 
depiction of characters.  That Aristophanes’ depiction of, for example, Socrates in The Clouds is 
a “Karikatur und unwahr” is, in Schlegel’s view, no grounds for criticizing the beauty of the play 
itself (ibid.).  According to A.W. Sclegel, who – some have claimed – drew heavily from his 
brother’s essay on Aristophanes for his lecture on Old Greek Comedy (1808), the Athenians did 
not understand the depiction of living characters in Greek Comedy as having anything to do with 
the actual people themselves75.  It was obvious to them that the stage versions were gross 
caricatures of their living counterparts:   
 
Man lasse sich dadurch nicht täuschen, daß die alten Komiker lebende Menschen 
genannt und mit allen Umständen auf das Theater gebracht haben, als ob sie deswegen 
in der That bestimmte Individuen dargestellt hätten.  Denn solche historische Personen 
haben bey ihnen immer eine allegorische Bedeutung, sie stellen ein  Gattung vor: und 
so wie in den Masken ihre Gesichtszüge, so dennoch ist dieß beständige A spi len auf 
die nächste Wirklichkeit […] sehr wesentlich für die Gattung (A.W. Schlegel 131).  
 
                                                
75 A.W. Schlegel was in many ways the great popularizer of his brother’s literary theories.  His Vienna lectures on 
dramatic literature, though original in their own right, particularly in their understanding of Shakesp are, borrowed 
heavily from Friedrich Schlegel’s work on Classical tr gedy and comedy and from his literary-historical subdivision 
between Classical and Romantic.  Oskar Walzel has, among others, written of August Wilhelm’s debt to his brother 
in this respect: “Schon Marie Joachimi-Dege hat gezeigt, daß Wilhem in den Wiener Vorlesungen d[ie] 
Anschaung[en] seines Bruders popularisiert und trivialisiert” (Walzel Methode? 39).   Holtermann echoes a similar 
attitude: “Friedrich Schlegels Gedanken wurden durch die einflußreichen Vorlesungen seines Bruders August 
Wilhelm Schlegel allgemein verbreitet und von verschiedenen Komödientheoretikern aufgegriffen und 
weiterentwickelt” (Holtermann 92).  Consequently, A.W. Schlegel’s lecture on Old Greek Comedy will hereafter be 






This is in keeping with the playfulness that both Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel 
ascribe to Old Greek Comedy.  They believed that its participants – both actors and audience – 
understood it as a play in the truest sense, as something that had no necessary responsibility to 
accuracy in depiction. It is therefore a moot point to debate about whether a play is faithful to 
reality since it cannot help but have some connection to reality, being that it is made by humans 
and addresses human situations, no matter how outlandish its formal depiction may be.  For 
similar reasons, Friedrich Schlegel believes that dramatic illusion can never actually be broken, 
since the cultural practice of staging a play naturally implies a pretense to accepting depicted 
actions as real, if only temporarily.  According to him, the whole purpose of the dramatic ritual is 
to actively engage the imagination in order to make-believe, as it were, that the depicted actions 
are real.  Aristophanes’ plays don’t break this illusion, at least not in any real sense.  The 
comedy, he says,  
 
verletzt nur, um mehr zu reizen, ohne wirklich zu zerstören.  In der Begeist rung des 
poetischen Witzes, schadet und stört es nicht, wenn die Täuschung scheinbar v rnichtet 
wird; weil das Wesentliche des Eindrucks einer solchen Darstellung, nicht in dem 
geordneten Zusammenhange dieser und in der Täuschung besteht, sondern in ebe
jener Begeisterung des Witzes, welche alle Schranken durchbricht (KAI 30f.). 
    
The illusion created by the comedy is genetically different from that created in the tragedy.  
Whereas all the various components and actions in a tragic play must be brought into relation 
with one another so as to result in the necessary implication of the tragic end, and thus must 
maintain dramatic illusion in the traditional sense, comedy continually finds its end in the 
various jokes (Witze) that are strung together in it.  The butt of each joke or witticism constitutes 






destruction of what is traditionally thought of as dramatic illusion is only seemingly (scheinbar) 
destroyed, since comedic illusion arises out of the enjoyment of each individual joke.  
 Schlegel’s understanding of comedy is more radical than it may at first seem.  Comedic 
theorists had often spoken of the mechanism of laughter as a constitutive element of comedy and 
that which separated it from tragedy, even though this had itself become questionable with the 
rise of the Rührende Lustspiel in the latter half of the 18th century.  And Schlegel’s predecessors 
in aesthetic philosophy had already emphasized the absolute autonomy that the artwork should 
allow itself.  Schlegel, however, goes further than his predecessors in so far as his theory implies 
that a play can be called a comedy, which lacks any dramatic uni y whatsoever, that more than 
being a play in the traditional sense – i.e. with a story and characters – is more akin to an 
unadulterated expression of joy.  But this is precisely what Schlegel indicates with his emphasis 
on Freude and Freiheit as the primary aim and mechanism, respectively, of comedy.  Even the 
traditionally important concept of laughter is not here seen as a constitutive element.  Under 
Schlegel’s conception, comedy is not meant to be first and foremost funny but rather joyous and 
wanton.  
Interestingly, an emphasis on the joyous and free aspect of Old Greek Comedy has 
continued in modern scholarship.  Dana Sutton, in her study of ancient comedy, attributes these 
characteristics to the protagonists in many of Aristophanes’ plays.  The Aristophanic comic 
hero’s primary objective, she writes, is “to achieve his ambitions of freedom and fun” (Sutton 
11).  And within the context of the Dionysian festivals, considerations of “fun” and “freedom” 







 August Wilhelm Schlegel manages to formulate more clearly than is brother the 
purposelessness that Friedrich indicates as being an essential element in Old Greek Comedy.  We 
form the best idea of the Old Comedy, he says, by considering it as the direct opposite of 
Tragedy: 
 
Die Tragödie ist der höchste Ernst der Poesie, die Komödie durchaus scherzhaft.  Der 
Ernst besteht, wie ich schon in der Einleitung zeigte, in der Richtung der Gemüthskräfte 
auf einen Zweck, und der Beschränkung ihrer Thätigkeit dadurch.  Sein 
entgegengesetztes besteht folglich in der scheinbaren Zwecklosigkeit und Aufhebung 
aller Schranken beym Gebrauch der Gemüthskräfte, und ist um so vollkmmner, je 
größer das dabey aufgewandte Maaß derselben, und je lebendiger der Anschein des 
zwecklosen Spiels und der uneingeschränkten Willkühr ist (A.W. Schlegel 129) 76. 
 
For Friedrich Schlegel and his brother, the Old Comedy is best understood, from a genre-
theoretical standpoint, as the complete opposite of Greek Tragedy.  Thus any formalistic features 
that are associated with tragedy, purposefulness (Zweckgebundenheit), restraint, earnestness must 
per definition be absent in comedy77.  Rather, it is purposeless freedom and the Freude, which 
results, that are the constitutive elements for reine or schöne Komödie, and are also, from an 
anthropological standpoint, the emotions or drives that are to be awakened in th  experiencing of 
the comedic act78. 
                                                
76 The notion of Aristophanic comedy as being sportive and playful has taken hold in modern Classical scholarship.  
See, for example, Harsh: “Old comedy is one of the 'sports' of literature. Fantastic from the beginning, if we may 
judge from the costumes of the komos-chorus, it delberately cultivated its perversity" (Harsh 257). 
77 This is why Friedrich Schlegel believed that in the transition from Old to New Greek Comedy, “komische 
Energie” was “unvermeidlich durch tragische Energie ersetzt”, creating “eine neue Gattung, eine Mischung des 
komischen und des tragischen Drama”.  This is because the plays of Menander have unified plots.  According to 
Schlegel, the comedies of Menander borrowed from tragedy “die sanfte Wärme der Leidenschaft, welche sich oft 
dem tragischen Ernst nähert, und den eigentümlichen Zauber der dramatischen Kunst, das Interesse durch ie leichte 
Entwicklung einer schöngeordneten vollständigen Handlung zu spannen” (KAI 32). 
78 In the emphasis that Schlegel places on Freude as an important aesthetic element in Schönheit, one might be 
mislead to believe that Schlegel implies that only Freude and thus, only comedy – the literary vehicle for Freude – 






IV.3 ‘Outer Freedom’ and the Freedom of Expression 
 
 “Äußre Freiheit” (ibid.) forms the other half of Schlegel’s definition of freedom, at lest in 
its relation to comedy, and it is his emphasis on the importance of ‘outer freedom’, which – as I 
hope to show – securely anchors Schlegel’s theory of comedy in a more general implied theory 
of society.  Schlegel’s description of ‘outer freedom’ is, if possible, even more terse than his 
explanation of ‘inner freedom’, but its meaning may still be gathered with relative certainty from 
passages in the Aristophanes-essay.  In the above-cited anthropological def nition that Schlegel 
gives for ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ freedom, he writes: “die äußre [Freiheit wird sichtbar] in dem 
Mutwillen, mit dem sie äußre Schranken verletzt, während das Gesetz großmütig seinem Rechte 
entsagt” (KAI 23).  One may think of ‘outer’ freedom as roughly the same as what is known in 
modern terminology as “negative liberty”79 and what Kant terms “bürgerliche Freiheit”.  If 
‘inner’ freedom is represented by the psychological drive to freeon self from acting in 
accordance with purpose and rationality, then ‘outer’ freedom is, for Schlegel, represented by 
society’s allowance to let one do so. It is, in simplest terms, what today is called the freedom of 
expression.  
For Schlegel, as for many authors and aesthetic philosophers towards the end of the 18th 
century, the belief in art’s asolute autonomy meant not only that the artist had to keep him- or 
herself from falling victim to an unreflective emulation of inherited literary norms, it also meant 
                                                                                                                                                             
tragedy, can also be classified as aesthetically schön.  “Der Schmerz”, he says, “kann ein höchst wirksames Medium 
des Schönen sein; aber die Freude ist schon an sich schön” (KAI 22).  
79 See Isaiah Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty”, which was first published in 1958.  Berlin is one of the first 
who clarified the implicit distinction between negative and positive freedom which exists in Enlightenment 
philosophy, positive liberty being associated with continental thinkers like Hegel, Rousseau, Herder, and Schlegel, 






that there could be no external restrictions placed on his or her art.  Fo  Schlegel, art’s only 
motivation must be Schönheit, and “Schönheit”, he writes, is “ein ächtes erstgebornes Kind der 
menschlichen Natur, und hat […] ein […] vollgültiges Recht, niemand zu gehorchen als sich 
selbst” (KAI 24).   This right applies to all arts, plastic as much as literary; however, from a 
socio-political perspective, Schlegel believes that literature – which expresses itself through the 
medium of language – necessarily falls victim more often to social and political censorship than 
other arts: “Die Poesie kommt leichter in Gefahr, dies Recht zu verlieren, als andre Künste” 
(ibid.).  And of all genres of literature, Schlegel believes that drama, particularly comedy, comes 
most often in danger of losing its expressive freedom: “Eine bloße Äusserung des Gefühls, die 
lyrische Darstellung der Freude, kommt nicht so leicht in Gefahr, ihre äußre Freiheit zu 
verlieren, – desto mehr die dramatische” (KAI 22)80.  Drama, as opposed to narrative and lyrical 
literature, requires a greater public infrastructure and public resou ces for its existence.  
Furthermore, for the greater part of the last 2,000 years, drama has been the only genre in the 
traditional Gattungstrias81, which could theoretically be experienced by the vast majority of 
society, since literacy was generally a privilege enjoyed by a small minority.  Because theater 
has had a greater public profile, it has at times tended to attract s onger political censorship than 
literature intended only for reading.  This was, for example, the cas  in France in the years 
leading up to the Revolution.  Although that country had a universal censorship (free publishing 
                                                
80 I take Schlegel’s implied formulation in this line – die dramatische Darstellung der Freude – to be a synonym for 
comedy, since this is or should be, for him, comedy’s essential quality.  
81 Epik, Dramatik, and Lyrik: literature was classed into these three genres as early as Plato (in the Republic) and 
Aristotle (in the Poetics), but this traditional system of classification held sway and remained relevant in Germany 
into the 19th century.  Goethe writes (1819), “Es gibt nur drei echte Naturformen der Poesie: die klar erzählende, die 
enthusiastisch aufgeregte und die persönlich handelnde: Epos, Lyrik und Drama” (Goethe 187).  All other sub-
genres, as it were, such as “Lehrgedicht”, “Epistel”, “Elegie”, Balade” and “Roman” (!), are for Goeth not 






and free theaters were unknown in the France of Louis XVI), it has often been noted that banned 
prose literature – both erotic and political – was nearly freely distributed whereas drama 
remained firmly guarded.  This doubtless has to do with the fact that largely only “the court and 
the high nobility” were the “prime customers” for works like the Encyclopédie, whereas drama’s 
reach was far wider (Heargraves 154)82.  However, according to Schlegel, the tendency to more 
strongly censor theatrical output lies not so much in its function as a widely accessible medium, 
but rather – and particularly in the case of comedy – becaus of the themes and subjects it 
addresses: 
 
Sie [die dramatische Darstellung der Freude, MB] nimmt den Stoff zu ihren 
Schöpfungen aus der Wirklichkeit, ihre Bestimmung ist eine öffentliche laute 
Darstellung des Lächerlichen, und ihre Freiheit ist dem Laster, der Torheit, dem 
geheiligten Irrtume fürchterlich (KAI 22f.). 
 
Comedy often addresses, and treats in a satirical manner, contemporary issues from reality; 
indeed, this is one of the defining characteristics of Aristophanic comedy.  He depicts the day-to-
day particularities of polis life, not – as in tragedy – mythological events.  For Schlegel, 
Aristophanes constantly tested the stability of the freedom that Athens allowed comedy by 
publicly ridiculing “Laster” and “Torheit” wherever he found these things.  Later in his essay, 
Schlegel again offers a formulation of the singular necessity of “äussre Freiheit” for comedy:   
 
In andern Kunstwerken ist das Genie von seiner äußern Lage unabhängig: seine innere 
Freiheit kann ihm niemand rauben.  Aber das komische Genie verlangt auch äußre 
                                                
82 For more on the proliferation of banned literature in France, see, for example, Robert Heargraves, 154-156 and 
Simon Schama’s seminal study, Citizens, particularly pp. 174-83. We see an analogous situation in modern 
American society where film and television – now the artistic mediums that enjoy the largest mainstream 
distribution – are subject to the careful inspection of the MPAA and the FCC, respectively, whereas drama, which 






Freiheit, kann ohne diese sich nur bis zur Grazie, nie bis zum höchsten Schönen 
erheben (KAI 29). 
 
According to Schlegel, political censorship may exist without, however, endangering the 
expressive freedom that tragedy, for example, requires.  Greek tragedy’s plots are taken from 
mythology, or in the case of Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes, the distant past, and tend to 
address questions of ‘human fate’ (KAI 25).  It is not inherent to tragedy, for example, that it be 
able to satirically address contemporary issues, and as such, Schlegel believes that a fully 
realized tragedy, one that is schön and by implication autonomous, can be written even under 
conditions of literary censorship.  However, censorship, at least as Schlegel knew it, had 
generally existed for the very purpose of deterring libel against heads of state83, which is 
precisely what Schlegel believes that comedy needs to be allowed t  do.  Thus for Schlegel, a 
comedy may not even hope to be of aesthetic value, unless the community in which it is 
produced fully acknowledges its right to free expression.  Without this, i  can achieve grace 
(Grazie) perhaps, but never beauty.  It is clear then, why Schlegel believes that the Athenians 
came closest to achieving ‘pure’ comedy, since they were the only society known to him, which 
protected comedy’s freedom of expression.  The “komische Muse” was, as Schlegel writes, “nur 
bei einem Volke, und bei diesem einen Volke nur eine kurze Zeit, frei” (KAI 24).  Schlegel sees 
the roots of this freedom in comedy’s religious origins.  It was originally, “nichts anders als eine 
öffentliche religiöse Handlung, ein Teil von dem Feste des Bakchus” (KAI 21). The playwright 
and the chorus were considered  “heilige Personen”, enjoying the protection and blessings of 
                                                
83 I make this distinction between censorship as Schlegel would have seen it and as it exists today, since the form 
that censorship often takes in many modern republics tends to be more often of a moral character, forbidding rather 






Dionysus, the “Gott der Freude” (KAI 23).  Being the god of irreve nce and intoxication, of 
ritualistic madness, of “freeing one from one’s normal self” (Sutton 2), Dionysus’ servants in the 
dramatic ritual were seen as naturally having the freedom to say anything and everything.  For 
Schlegel, the dramatic poets were the protected human mouthpieces of Dionysus on earth; “Aus 
ihnen redete der Gott der Freude, und unter diesem Schutze waren sie unverl tzlich” (KAI 23).  
And with the development of Athenian democracy the original religious rit al became a political 
institution:   
 
Bald ward aus einem religiösen Institut auch ein politisches, aus dem Feste eine 
öffentliche Angelegenheit, aus der Unverletzlichkeit des Priestes eine symbolische 
Darstellung der bürgerlichen Freiheit.  Der Chor besonders deutete af das Athenische 
Volk, welches in der Schönheit eines Spiels seine eigne Heiligkeit erblickte (KAI 24). 
 
Comedy’s freedom of expression developed, according to Schlegel, into a symbol of 
freedom itself, a symbol of the unique democracy that Athens enjoyed, under which citizens 
enjoyed a widened platform for publicly presenting their grievances.  Of course, this complete 
freedom was only granted to drama, and did not exist for the Athenians as a civil right, nor does 
Schlegel advocate the civil protection of the freedom of expression for anything other than art.  
The trial of Socrates is proof enough that the Athenians had no notion of natural human rights 
that could be constitutionally protected.  And Schlegel takes pains to show that the freedom of 
speech granted to the drama was only conditionally allowed, that is to say, protected only during 
religious festivities.  There is, nevertheless, some indication that Schlegel may have idealized the 
freedom allowed in Aristophanes’ comedies.  K. J. Dover indicates for example, that we cannot 






nowhere find any indication that he criticized the democratic state- ystem of Athens; rather, his 
political satire limits itself to attacks on politicians and on political decisions (Dover 33).  
However, even if Schlegel misread the situation in Athens, it does not fu damentally affect his 
argument; it would simply make Aristophanic comedy less ideal according to his theory than he 
had supposed it to be.  Aristophanic comedy is, after all, for him only the best known 
approximation of the comedic ideal he wishes to develop.   
 
 
IV.4 The Festivity of Greek Comedy 
 
The fact that Greek Comedy’s worth relied in part on a certain political – specifically 
democratic – context, does not mean that, for Schlegel, it should ideally b  political in content or 
aim.  His theory of comedy might itself be considered revolutionary – it does, after all, radically 
reinterpret the meaning of the genre to the point that it is nearly only applicable to Aristophanes 
– but it is not something that in itself should carry a revolutionary or socio-critical aim. This can 
already be gathered from the stipulation that the ‘inner freedom’ required of comedy means that 
it cannot be bound to any purpose outside of itself, implying that it notseek to have any social or 
political effect.  True, the plays of Aristophanes do address political ssues, and are much more 
obviously political than the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides.  And it might 
certainly seem that Aristophanes wished to have some wider social effect than that of merely 
bringing joy to his audience when he criticized prominent political figures.  However, in 






Greek Comedy’s festive context.  It seems to be rather important to Schlegel that Greek 
comedies were staged during religious festivals, and that thus watever potentially subversive 
undercurrents they contained could be rendered innocuous by the fact that it was all only 
“Scherz”, taking place as they did during the festival dedicated to the god of playfulness and 
intoxication.  The “Verletzung der [äußren] Schranken”, the joyous emancipation from all 
societal strictures, which Schlegel believed was a constitutive element of Greek Comedy, was 
according to him “nur scheinbar”, since it took place during the festivals (KAI 23).  Thus any 
societal criticism and personal attacks it contained could be explained as a result of the general 
relaxation of standards of behavior and the bawdy spirit of irreve ence towards both men and 
gods that resulted from the holiday spirit (Levi 175).   
This playful and societally innocuous freedom has more modern parallels.  “So stellten sich 
die Römer in den Saturnalien die Freiheit dar”, writes Schlegel, and “ein ähnlicher Gedanke lag 
vielleicht bei dem Karneval zum Grunde” (KAI 23).  In fact, we would likely not be far off the 
mark in comparing Schlegel’s notion of the societal function of comedy with that, which Bakhtin 
gives to the carnival in his study of Rabelais, and interstingly, Bakhtin notes that Rabelais and 
Aristophanes have often been compared (Bakhtin 98).  Like the Greek d amatic festivals – the 
Lenaia and the City Dionysia –, the medieval carnival offers a “nonofficial […] and 
extrapolitical aspect of the world” (Bakhtin 6).  While it lasts, the carnival “is subject only to its 
laws, that is, the laws of its own freedom.  It has a universal spirit” (Bakhtin 7).  Bakhtin, like 
Schlegel, emphasizes the fact that the festival was extrapolitical.  It constituted a space that had 
no necessary connection to the world outside of itself.  Thus, whatever political attacks the 






the bounds of the festival because of its unique structure.  All externally directe  purposeful aims 
are neutralized.   
Thus the festival, and the understanding that the Athenians implicitly had of their festival, 
meant that whatever purposefulness Aristophanes’ plays might have had, was only seeming 
purposefulness.  For Schlegel, this would have been obvious to the Athenians.  D a Sutton, in 
her study of ancient comedy, Ancient Comedy: the War of the Generations (1993), writes that 
one cannot correctly understand ancient comedy unless one considers it f stive context.  In fact, 
she goes so far as to term ancient comedy “festive comedy” in order to emphasize this point 
(Sutton x).  Furthermore, the festival context in which these plays were staged is reflected in the 
plays themselves.  “Festive comedies”, she writes, all “tend to have a characteristic spirit and 
viewpoint reflecting the festival holidays that served as their production contexts” (ibid.).  For 
example, in the plays, there are certain “psychological mechanisms”, later she calls them 
“anxiety-reducing mechanisms”, such as “self-referential metadrama and deliberate violation of 
dramatic illusion”, that “create an emotionally safe environment, ad deflate comic derision” 
(ibid.).    The freedom allowed in the comedies because of their festive cont xt is, according to 
Sutton, one of the reasons why the Roman senate later forced the suppr ssion of the Bacchae 
festivals in Rome (Sutton 6).   
There is one key difference, however, between Schlegel’s understanding on the one hand, 
and Sutton’s and Bakhtin’s on the other.  Both Sutton and Bakhtin acknowledge the social role 
of these festivals as mechanisms “for venting the aggravations, frustrations, and resentments” felt 
by individuals (Sutton, 6).  In the case of Athens, this could have been the frustrations resulting 






imminent defeat in the Peloponnesian War, or it could have been the powerlessness that certain 
citizens felt towards richer or politically more powerful peers.  The festival was, according to 
Sutton, as such “an approved instrument of socialization” (ibid.).  Though Schlegel does not 
mention this function of the festivals – indeed he really only mentions Greek Comedy’s festive 
nature in passing – it seems that he would have been reluctant to accept su h a function.  The 
Greek comedy and the festival in which it was performed was primarily, for Schlegel, an 
opportunity for the celebration of joy, and it was not a mechanism whereby, in allowing periodic 
though innocuous ventings of frustrations, the status-quo could be maintained.  He does not see 
the festival as cathartic, but as purely affirmative.  
 
 
IV.5 Logical Implications of Positing an Ideal: Reasons 
 for the Unattainability of the Comedic Ideal 
 
It is a distinct peculiarity of Schlegel’s theory of comedy as expressed in his Aristophanes-
essay – moreso than any theories or beliefs that he held regar ing other literary genres – that the 
realization of comedic perfection is not only a function of formal requirements – in the case of 
comedy, the symbolization of Freude through the depiction of purposeless [e.g. free and 
unbounded] joy – but that it is also premised on, and bsolutely dependent on a particular 
community’s capacity for Freude.  It is an ideal that can only be realized in a community, whose 
members have achieved, “eine Bildung des Menschen durch Freiheit und Natur […], wo alle 
seine Kräfte ihrem freien Spiel und ihrer eignen Entwicklung ungehemmt überlassen sind” (KAI 






Thus the realization of the comedic ideal is, by definition, dependent on the realization of a 
certain communal Bildungsideal.  This is, for example, not how Schlegel sees tragedy as 
functioning.  Whereas Schlegel consistently emphasizes that Greek Comedy did not achieve 
ideal beauty84, he does not qualify his praise for Greek Tragedy.  The Greeks did in fact realize 
the ideal tragical in Schlegel’s eyes, namely, under Sophocles, and this despite the less than 
utopian level of Bildung that he believed the Greeks had achieved.  In fact, Sophoclean tragedy 
represents for Schlegel the apex of Greek literature overall, after which he believed it inevitably 
decayed.  In Von den Schulen der Griechischen Poesie (1794), Schlegel calls Sophocles “das 
höchste Schöne”, and considers his play to be “das Maximum der Griechischen Poesie” (KAI 
14f.).  In praise that it would be hard to exceed, Sophocles is elsewhere described as having 
reached “das äußerste Ziel der Griechischen Poesie” (KAI 296), as having fully realized “[die] 
aesthetischen und technischen Gesetze” (KAI 297).   
If we return to the Aristophanes-essay we can see why, in Schlegel’s view, the tragic genre 
is socio-historically capable of achieving its full potential in an imperfect society, whereas 
comedy cannot.  “Die Tragödie”, Schlegel claims, “spannt und erhebt ir Publikum, hält also das 
Verderben des Geschmacks so lange als möglich ab” (KAI 25).  Tragedy, then, far from being 
limited to the cultivation of its public, rather dignifies it [“erhebt ihr Publikum”], and can have a 
positive influence on taste.  “Das Komische”, on the other hand, “richtet sich, weit mehr als das 
Tragische, nach dem Grade der Reizbarkeit und der Fassungskraft seines Publikums; und diese 
hängen wieder von dem Maße der geselligen Ausbildung und aller Seelenkräfte ab” (KAI 26f.).  
In other words, whereas tragedy, in Schlegel’s eyes, might bring out what is best in a particular 
                                                







society, comedy appeals to and is dependent on common tastes.  Whereas trag dy’s intended 
audience was a subclass of Athenian society consisting of the most cultivated members, the 
comedy spoke to the general public, and to general tastes.  And, as Schlegel explains: “[D]ie 
Sitten waren schon sehr verderbt, und der komische Geschmack noch roh” (KAI 25) by the time 
that Aristophanes wrote his plays.  Whereas “der Künstler Aristophanes […] sich an die 
Geschichte vom Anfange der Kunst [schließt], [findet] der Mensch Aristophanes […] seinen 
Platz in der Geschichte vom Verfalle” (ibid.) 85.  Günter Oesterle, summarizing why Schlegel 
believed the tragedy had reached “das höchste Schöne” (KAI 14), writes: “[F]ür die tragische 
Kunst fielen historisch rechtzeitig die Entwicklung der Sitten und des ästhetischen Materials 
zusammen” (Oesterle 444).   
Schlegel is unequivocal about the absolute predication of the comedic ideal on the level of 
Bildung that a society has achieved, and about the rather remote possibility that is will ever be 
possible: 
 
Dramatische Vollständigkeit ist in der reinen Komödie, deren Bestimmung öffentliche 
Darstellung und deren Prinzip der öffentliche Geschmack ist, nicht möglich; wenigstens 
so lange nicht möglich, bis sich das Verhältnis der Empfänglichkeit zur Selbsttätigkeit 
im Menschen ganz ändert, bis reine Freude, ohne allen Zusatz von Schmerz, inr icht, 
seinen Trieb aufs höchste zu spannen (KAI 31). 
 
There is a quite logical system that underlies Schlegel’s theory of comedy.  His theory 
posits an ideal of a unique sort.  For tragedy, we have textual documents, namely the plays of 
                                                
85 Schlegel sees the Golden Age of Athens, like many scholars before and since, as lying between the victories 
against Persia and the beginning of the Peloponnesia  War in 431 BC.  By the time Aristophanes had written his last 
plays in the 380’s, Athens had suffered a terrible plague (430-29), a military debacle in Sicily (415-3), two 







Sophocles, which by definition provide us with what the logician would cal  sufficient, though 
not necessary, examples of the realization of the ideal tragical.  Not so the ideal comical.  In so 
far as the ideal comedy has not yet been achieved there is no attribute, or set of attributes – be 
they socio-political structure or having to do with dramatic form – that we could point to which 
are sufficient for comedy’s ideal realization.  There are, however, attributes or characteristics, the 
absense of which are necessary.  Many of these have been mentioned above: tragic elements like 
dramatic purposefulness, restrictions on the freedom of artistic expression, audiences who are 
incapable of relinquishing themselves completely to the experience of pure Freude.  Thus, 
though the definition of the ideal comedy might be a positive one (i.e. the positive realization of 
Freude), in the examination of the societal conditions, political structures, and stylistic elements 
in comedy, we are confronted everywhere with negative conditions.  We can, in other words, 
only know what is necessarily and sufficiently bad (or wrong), not what is necessarily or 
sufficiently good (or right).  This is the logical implication of Schlegel’s statement: “Allein auch 
diesen Moment [vollkommner Schönheit] hat die Griechische Komödie nicht erreicht” (KAI 25).  
And it explains why Schlegel believes that, from the perspective of his theory, it is rather easy to 
point out the failures of Old Greek Comedy: “Aus der Natur des frien Komischen überhaupt, 
und aus dem Ursprünge und Charakter der alten Griechische Komödie, erklären sich sehr leicht 
ihre vorzüglichen Fehler” (ibid.).  
 If, according to Schlegel, the Greek Comedy did not reach a state of “vollkommne[r] 
Schönheit”, then clearly, Aristophanes’ plays contain some failures, which kept them from 
achieving aesthetic perfection, and obviously these ‘failures’ have nothing to do with the 






seen, are precisely what Schlegel praises in Aristophanes.  That the socio-political protection of 
comedy’s expressive freedom is in itself no safeguard for a comedy’s aesthetic worth is clear; 
‘external freedom’ is after all, only a precondition.  The primary esthetic objective of comedy 
is, for Schlegel, Freude – both its depiction and its effect –, and ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ freedom, as 
aesthetic categories, are of relevance only in so far as they promote that end; they are, so to 
speak, to be treated only as aesthetic means.   
Thus, whatever aesthetic ‘failures’ Aristophanes’ plays are seen to have must be understood 
as being hindrances to Freude, or alternately, as promoters of Schmerz which, for Schlegel, is the 
absolute opposite of Freude.  Among these ‘failures’ is, surprisingly, Aristophanes’ satire, or at 
least certain aspects of it.  An examination of Schlegel’s criticism of Aristophanes’ satire will 
make it clearer what role Schlegel believes comedy is to play in his conception of both the actual 
and the ideal society.  In the Aristophanes-essay, we find the following cryptic sen ences: 
 
Noch ehe sie [die altgriechische Komödie, MB] sich aus ihrem fremdartigen Ursprunge 
[dem religiösen, MB] zu reiner Poesie entwickelte und völlig bildete, entartete sie schon 
in persönliche und politische Nebenabsichten.  Die Satire des Aristophanes ist sehr oft 
nicht poetisch sondern persönlich, und ebenso demagogisch als die Art, mit der er den 
Wünschen und den Meinungen des Volks schmeichelt (KAI 28f.). 
 
 
This has been seen as proof that Schlegel advocates an unsatirical comedic ideal86.  On the 
one hand, it would seem odd that Schlegel develops his entire theory of comedy from 
Aristophanes and at the same time criticizes that which Aristophanes is perhaps most famous for, 
his satire.  On the other hand, satire is per definition bound to a purpose.  Satire is, as Stefan 
                                                
86 This is Niedrig’s (1950) reading of Schlegel’s theory of comedy (27).  This also seems to be Japp’s (1999) reading 
as well, when he states that “die äußre Freiheit di polemischen Zwecke der Satire befördert, die Schlegel gerne 






Scherer writes, “normgebunden, weil sie aus der Perspektive der Wahrheit – einer richtigen Sicht 
– heraus formuliert wird“ (Scherer Dramenvorlesungen 5.1).  In this sense, it would seem that 
satire, by its very nature, is at odds with the purposelessness that i  the primary characteristic of 
‘inner freedom’.  Thus, it is easy to see why the role that satire should play in Schlegel’s notion 
of ideal comedy is the source of so much confusion.   
 However, if we look at the above quote, it seems that not all satire, but rather only 
persönliche87 satire is being criticized; it seems as if Schlegel implies that poetische satire is 
permissible.  It is not entirely clear what Schlegel means by persönliche and poetische satire, and 
as Brummack writes, “das Begriffspaar poetische und persönliche Satire gibt es vor Schlegel 
nicht, auch bei ihm ist es vereinzelt” (Brummack 25).  Brummack makes th  convincing 
argument that persönliche satire is not to be confused with “Personalsatire” (ibid.), which is 
satire that is directed at a particular known individual.  Rather persönliche satire should be 
thought of as ‘personal’ in the sense that it serves the personal interests of the poet; satire, as 
Schlegel writes, with “persönliche[n] und politische[n] Nebenabsichten” (KAI 29).  Thus, for 
Brummack, Schlegel criticizes the fact that Aristophanes uses the dramatic platform as a forum 
for attacking his own personal enemies.   
According to Brummack, Schlegel is here implying that there are ce tain forms of satire 
that are not only permissible, but actually to be valued, at least within the context of an imperfect 
comedy.  Brummack believes that this is what Schlegel means by the following: 
 
Bis dahin [that is, until that time when the comedy achieves its ideal, MB] wird die 
komische Kunst, um die Energie zu erreichen, ohne welche alle dramatishe Darstellung 
                                                







unnatürlich und unwirksam ist, das Schlechte und den Schmerz zu Hülfe nehmen 
müssen: bis dahin bleibt also auch die Erbsünde der komischen Energie die notwendige 
Lust am Schlechten.  Die reine Lust ist selten lächerlich, aber das Lächerliche (sehr oft 
nichts anders als die Lust am Schlechten) ist weit wirksamer und lebendiger.  Die 
eigentliche Aufgabe der Komödie ist: mit dem kleinsten Schmerz das höchste Leben zu 
bewirken (KAI 31). 
 
It might seem like a complete contradiction that Schlegel now claims that the actual purpose 
of the comedy is “mit dem kleinsten Schmerz das höchste Leben zu bewirken”; however the 
context indicates that this is not the purpose of the ideal comedy, but rather that this should be 
the goal of any comedy created in a society that is not yet capable of excitement in the dramatic 
act which is wholly bereft of Schmerz – i.e. derision, sarcasm, mockery, ridicule, satire etc.  
Brummack mistakenly sees this as being an indication that Schlegel b lieves that satire is not 
only inevitable in unideal comedy, but that it is desirable.  “Solange [die vollkommene Komödie] 
nicht verwirklicht ist”, writes Brummack, “gehört, in ihrem Dienste, die Satire zur komischen 
Kunst” (Brummack 23)88.  According to Brummack, Schlegel believes that comedy does not 
only find itself “in Wechselwirkung mit der Progression der Menschheit” (Brummack 23); in 
addition, comedy “soll aber auch auf die Bildung der Menschheit zurückwirken” (Brummack 
23).  Thus Brummack maintains that Schlegel wants comedy to help bring about the positive 
progression of humanity.  If this were in fact the case, then it would make sense that Schlegel 
would value satire for its didactic potential.  But Schlegel repeat dly makes it clear that the 
comedy, both in an ideal society and in a less than ideal society, should have no purpose outside 
of itself.  It can only be a reflection of the state of man, not aid in its promotion.  Schlegel would 
                                                
88 This sentence could be read as implying an unavoidability rather than a desirability.  However, the subsequent 
quote should show that Brummack does in fact ascribe a Bildungs-objective to Schlegel’s comedy.  Interestingly, 






not have emphasized Old Greek Comedy’s festive context, which he believed neutralized any 
satirical purpose that someone might have associated with it if he did not firmly believe in this.   
Rather, Schlegel’s remarks on the role of “das Schlechte” and “der Schmerz” in comedy 
must be read as indicating that Schlegel believes that until the human community is fully 
actualized, comedy will simply not be able to avoid “Lust am Schlechten”.  In such a society, the 
most that a comedy can hope to do is minimize Schmerz as much as possible.  This is what 
Schlegel means when he says that the comic playright’s job is “mit dem kleinsten Schmerz das 
höchste Leben zu bewirken” (KAI 31).  In an ideal society, however, when individuals are 
completely inwardly and outwardly free, satire will not even be al  to be a part of comedy, 
since there will be nothing for the society’s members to make fun of.  
If Friedrich Schlegel’s normative comedic ideal is so intimaely connected with the 
structure of the society in which it is produced, then it makes sen e to look more closely at what 
Schlegel believes this society will look like.  As Schlegel indicates with his emphasis on Greek 
Comedy’s festive context, the relationship between society and comedy is one-way; comedy is to 
have no didactic effect.  Hitherto, I have alluded to the fact that the society must give free reign 
to the comedic impulse, or in other words, abstain from censoring it.  But can anything more be 
said about the desired socio-political structure that will foster comedy?  Is it only incidental for 
Schlegel that Athens was a democracy or was it a necessary correlation?  In the Aristophanes-
essay itself, Schlegel gives no definite answer, except to say that in Athens, comedy was “eine 
symbolische Darstellung der bürgerlichen Freiheit” (KAI 24), which is really only a descriptive 
and not a prescriptive statement.  Elsewhere, Schlegel says that comedy is a function “de[s] 






Friedrich Schlegel might have considered the ideal societal structure for the realization of his 
comedic ideal, one is forced to look elsewhere, namely in his early political thought.  In the brief 
detour that follows (Chapter V), I hope to illustrate why, for Schlegel, the democratic state is the 
only type of society, which could foster his comedic ideal.  This will, I hope, clarify the question 























V Schlegel’s Early Political Thought and its Implications  
for his Theory of Comedy 
 
To speak of a political philosophy in the early Schlegel is to engage in constructive 
theoretical work that is far more speculative than working out Schlegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie 
or his anthropological Lebensphilosophie.  To say that any formalized political philosophy can 
be gleaned from the early Schlegel comes close to being a gross over-exaggeration.  As Behler 
writes, Schlegel only seriously started turning to politics in his works after 1804 and before that 
addressed the issue only occasionally in small publications89.  This is not to say that he was 
apolitical.  From his letters to his brother, we can see that he was interested in politics from quite 
early on90.  In January 1796, for example, he informed his brother: “Bin erst bei dem Politischen, 
wie leicht und angenehm wird da alles von der Hand gehen, auch weit einträglicher” (KAXXIII 
275).  And in fact he had planned to add a third volume to his aforementioned work on Greek 
and Roman literature which would have discussed primarily the political revolutions of the 
Greeks and Romans, though this never actually made it to paper (Behler Einleitung XX).  We 
may say, that in so far as Schlegel favored to such a strong degree, all things Classical, that he 
would have looked favorably upon the political systems of the ancients.  And he does in fact 
write in his Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus, which is Schlegel’s most famous 
                                                
89 Behler: “Unter den Werken, die Friedrich Schlegel s it 1804 verfaßt hat, nehmen Schriften historischen und 
politischen Inhalts eine beherrschende Rolle ein”.  Before 1804, “[hatte] Schlegel politische und historische Themen 
nur beiläufig, in kleineren Gelegenheitsschriften und wenigen Fragmenten behandelt” (Behler Einleitung XV). 
90 Beiser locates the root of this interest in Schlegel’s reaction to the French Revolution and his relationship with 
Caroline Böhmer, herself a sort of revolutionary figure in the short-lived Republic of Mainz (Beiser 245).  Behler, 
on the other hand, emphasizes rather Schlegel’s Clasical studies as the primary cause of his interest in politics: 
“Schlegels Interesse an politisch-historischen Themen findet demnach in der Beschäftigung mit der klassischen 
Antike seinen Ursprung” (Behler Einleitung XX).  Obviously both aspects are probably at play here, but I tend to 







early political treatise, that “die politische Kultur der Modernen noch im Stande der Kindheit 
gegen die der Alten [ist]” (KAVII 18).  It is primarily via Schlegel’s Versuch that we may gain 
insight into his early political thought.   
 It is best to approach Schlegel’s political thought by first noting that, for the early 
Schlegel, politics – like art and religion in fact – is subservient to the great program of human 
Bildung.  “D[ie] Bestimmung des Menschen”, he later wrote, “ist das Wahre zu erkennen, das 
Gute zu tun, und das Schöne zu genießen, und in seinem Denken, Tun und Empfinden Eintracht 
zu bewirken” (KAI 627).  In a sense, this can be partially understood as being the same as what 
many German Enlightenment thinkers were working out (e. g. Lessing’  die Erziehung des 
Menschengeschlechts, Kant’s Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher 
Absicht, Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, and Schiller’s 
Aesthetische Briefe), namely, the understanding of the progress of humanity and the 
programmatic determination of the correct Bildung for humans.  At any rate, the ideal for 
Schlegel is to develop a political system, which promotes culture and cultivation on the one 
hand, and harmonious life on the other.  In this sense, Schlegel is decidedely outside of – and 
would have been opposed to – Anglo-American political thought in the tradition of Hobbes; that 
is, political thought that tended to view the state as a safeguard for the protection of individuals 
from one another.  Schlegel’s is a positive political ideal.  Its “Fundament und Objekt”, as 
Hendrix writes in his study on Schlegel’s political worldview, is “die Gemeinschaft der 
Menschen”  (Hendrix 9).  In the Versuch, Schlegel calls for a “Gemeinschaft der Sitten” (KAVII 
18), which indicates both an insistence on the value of the community and an emphasis on socio-






the “fundamental leitmotiv” of Schlegel’s entire political-philosophical development (Beiser 
261), which is as prevalent in his early panegyrics to republicanism as it is in his later medieval 
(Christian monarchical) state-theory.  Even in his republican phase, Schlegel is hostile to the idea 
of the individualistic liberal state, and favors a more holistic political system.  This is, in fact, 
one of the conclusions of his Versuch.   
Originally intended as a review of Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden, Schlegel’s Versuch 
ultimately carried the subtitle “veranlaßt durch die Kantische Schrift zum ewigen Frieden”, 
which is apt, since the essay ended up being something between a review and a free presentation 
of his own views.  In his Versuch Schlegel takes issue with Kant’s proposed form of 
representative republicanism.  In order to understand Schlegel’s approach, it is not necessary 
here to go into Kant’s own political theory.  Suffice it to say that Schlegel believes, unlike Kant, 
that the only true form of republicanism is complete democracy91.  For Schlegel, the ideal 
political system would be one in which the state acts in accordance with the general will: “der 
allgemeine Wille [ist] die notwendige Bedingung d[es] Republikanismus” (KAVII 16)92.  But 
since, for Schlegel, the general will is an abstracted idealization and cannot actually be 
determined by the state, the democratic will of the majority will have to act as a surrogate for the 
general will:  
                                                
91 Jakob Baxa succinctly pointed out the difference i  Kant’s and Schlegel’s theories of the state when  wrote the 
following (1931): “Der tiefere Grund, warum Friedrich Schlegel in offenen Gegensatz zu Kant tritt, liegt darin, daß 
Kant unter Republik einen repräsentativen Staat im Sinne Montesquieus und unter ‘Republikanismus’ das 
‘Staatsprinzip der Absonderung der ausführenden Gewalt von der gesetzgebenden’ versteht, während Schlegel sich 
als Anhänger der unmittelbaren Demokratie bekennt ud nur in ihr das Urbild einer echten Republik zu sehen 
vermag” (Baxa 30). 
92 It is not hard here to see the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and this influence has not gone unnoticed.  See, 
for example; Hendrix 8; Behler Einleitung XXIII; Brummack 12.  Sabine characterizes the Rousseauean “general 
will” as representing the “collective good, which is not the same thing as the private interests of its members.  In 








Der absolut allgemeine […] Wille [kann] im Gebiete der Erfahrung nicht vorkommen 
[…], und [existiert] nur in der Welt der reinen Gedanken. […] Es bleibt hier nichts 
übrig als durch eine Fiktion einen empirischen Willen als Surrogat des a priori 
gedachten absolut allgemeinen Willens gelten zu lassen; und da die reine Auflösung 
des politischen Problems unmöglich ist, sich mit der Approximation dieses praktischen 
x zu begnügen (KAVII 16).   
 
 The determination of the general will always remain a philosophical ideal. In practice, 
political organization will have to settle for a second best: the approximation of the general will 
through the democratic will of the majority: “Der Wille der Mehrheit soll als Surrogat des 
allgemeinen Willens gelten” (KAVII 17).  Thus Schlegel shows himself to be a devout democrat.  
But he also shows that for him, the ideal remains a state in which t e communal spirit reigns 
supreme and in which the general will takes precedence over the desir s and even rights of any 
of its individual citizens93.  The historical example that Schlegel has in mind is, as might be 
expected, Attic democracy, and more than an echo of French revolutionary de ls, Schlegel is 
essentially proposing a system that is as close as possible to that which he believes to have been 
achieved in Athens.  It is, for him, the best possible organization of a  imperfect society, which 
is in fact what he saw as the purpose of political philosophy.  Schlegel alludes to the practical 
nature of his political thought when he writes that he sees, “in ihr [der Politik, MB] eine 
praktische Wissenschaft, deren Objekt die Relation der praktischen Individuen und Arten ist” 
                                                
93 It is possibly indicative of Schlegel’s dissatisfaction with the notion of democratic government as the best possible 
– though not perfectly ideal – surrogate for the general will, that he gave up on democracy so soon after the 
publication of this essay.  His turn to the medieval corporation of Christian monarchies was motivated by the desire 
to find a socio-political system that could, if possible, achieve the ideal of the fully cultivated and unified society on 
earth.  Already in his Philosophische Lehrjahre (1796-99), we find the note: “Nie ist mehr wahre Freyheit und 







(Hendrix 9)94.  Nevertheless his ideal remains, as he writes in the same essay, the “Gemeinschaft 
der Sitten” (KAVII 18) that he believes the ancients had come closest to approximating95.  As 
Beiser writes, by “Gemeinschaft der Sitten”, Schlegel means “  society held together not only by 
abstract laws but also by a common public spirit.  Simply conforming to the laws is not enough 
for the true state: there must also be genuine affection and love betw en fellow citizens” (Beiser 
252).  Interestingly, the argumentative approach in both Schlegel’s th ory of comedy and his 
political philosophy is symmetrical.  An ideal is posited, which however, is either unattainable or 
not yet attained, and actual models are offered – Aristophanic comedy and democracy, 
respectively –, which best approximate those ideals.  It would seem that the “Gemeinschaft der 
Sitten” is exactly the type of society that Schlegel believ s would allow for the realization of the 
comedic ideal.  In the Aristophanes-essay, he writes: 
 
Sie [die Komödie, MB] wird es [das höchste Schöne, MB] erreichen, wenn […] aus 
Gesetzmäßigkeit Freiheit wird, wenn die Würde und die Freiheit der Kunst ohne Schutz 
sicher, wenn jede Kraft des Menschen frei und jeder Mißbrauch der Freiheit unmöglich 
sein wird (KAI 29). 
 
Certainly, democracy alone won’t be able to ensure that “jede Kraft des Menschen frei 
[ist]”.  This can only come from the positive self-actualization of each individual citizen, and 
will thus only occur in the true “Gemeinschaft der Sitten”, as Schlegel sees it.  The conditions 
                                                
94 This citation is taken from Hendrix, who is quoting from an earlier edition of Schlegel’s works (not the Kritische 
Ausgabe) and Hendrix gives nothing but the page number.  As such, I don’t know for sure where this quote comes 
from, but it must be from Schlegel’s early writings, because Hendrix is here discussing Schlegel’s theory of state 
before 1802. 
95 Interestingly, Kant was explicit in his belief tha classical politics had been fundamentally flawed: Kant wrote of 
the ancient republics that they lacked “ein repräsentative[s] System – in welchem allein eine republikanische 
Regierungsart möglich, ohne welche sie (die Verfassung mag sein, welche sie wolle) despotisch und gewaltätig ist. 
[…] Keine der alten sogenannten Republiken hat dieses gekannt, und sie mußten sich darüber auch schlechterdings 
in dem Despotismus auflösen, der unter der Obergewalt ines Einzigen noch der erträglichste unter allen ist” (Kant 






that Schlegel stipulates above imply that “wenn die Würde und die Freiheit der Kunst ohne 
Schutz sicher, wenn jede Kraft des Menschen frei und jeder Mißbrauch der Freiheit unmöglich 
sein wird”, there won’t even be any need for a representative political system.  What makes 
democracy seem like the preferred societal structure for promoting and nuturing comedy on its 
path to realization, is Schlegel’s pervasive emphasis on freedom, and on the fact that comedy, 
unlike other genres, requires that all members of society work toward a universal and equal 
Bildungsideal so that they can each realize their inner freedom and experience true Freude.  It 
seems to require not only a community of free members, but also equal members.   
Thus Schlegel’s later political ideal, the feudal state, would be inadequate here because in 
the feudal state, there are various classes of individuals who might achieve a certain 
Bildungsideal, as it were, which is particular to their specific social class, but there is no 
universal ideal that is the same for all members.  Thus, though Schlegel might have believed later 
that the true “Gemeinschaft der Sitten” was actually more realizable in a feudal state than in a 
democracy, the comedy, at least the comedy as he posits it in th s early form, is not.  The only 
political system in which the ideal comical is conceivable is necessarily that which allows all of 
its members equal participation.  And, in fact, after Schlegel turned to medieval feudalism as his 
political ideal, he did change his attitude towards comedy: 
   
Keineswegs sei die ‘Freiheit des Witzes’ statthaft ‘für die gemischte Menge, die des 
Genusses dieser Freiheit gar nicht würdig ist’: es seien sonst‘die allerunangenehmsten, 
schädlichsten Folgen zu befürchten’, wie der Mißbrauch der Komödienfreiheit in Athen 








But dismissing democracy and turning to feudalism would amount to a fundamental 
alteration of his theory of comedy.  The feudal state would be contradictory to it.  And the 
adoption of the feudal state as the best political system for the at ainment of the ideal community 
would necessitate the construction of a radically different comedic ideal.  As Schlegel indicates 
in the Aristophanes-essay: “Die Freude und die Schönheit ist kein Priv legium der Gelehrten, der 
Adligen und der Reichen; sie ist ein heiliges Eigentum der Menschheit” (KAI 26).  Nevertheless, 
one must be careful of ascribing too much explicit political substance to Schlegel’s theory.  To 
say, as Holtermann does, that Schlegel’s theory elevates the com dy “zu der demokratischen 
Kunstform schlechthin” (Holterman 96), runs the risk of confusing what Schlegel sees as the 





















I have sought in the present study to arrive at the socio-political mplications that 
underlie Friedrich Schlegel’s theory of comedy as presented in hisessay on Aristophanes.  I 
wished to show to what extent Schlegel’s aesthetic system as reg rds beauty and purity in 
comedy presupposes a normative understanding of society, and I have tried to outline what 
that normative understanding looks like.  That Schlegel sought for totality in his thought, 
that he saw all aspects of human existence – art, political structure, culture and religion – as 
interconnected and as mutually dependent is, as I mentioned in my review of secondary 
research (Chapter II), a fact that has not escaped scholarship.  Dierkes (1980), Behrens 
(1984), Schanze (1966), Michel (1982), Dannenberg (1993) and Mennemeier (1971) have 
all – in their expositions of Schlegel’s early thought – placed special emphasis on this fact to 
varying degrees.  In this study however, I took this tendency in Schlegel, and looked at one 
text – his essay on Aristophanes –, one that moreover, purported to offer a single theory – a 
theory of comedy –, so that I might see what this interconnectedness looks like on a minute 
level, what the practical implications of this tendency in his thougt might be for a specific 
case.  This undertaking necessitated that I first extract as best as possible a workable and 
systematic assessment of Schlegel’s theory in its own right, irrespective of its historical 
relevance in the German reception of Aristophanes in the 19th century or in the emergence 
of German Romantic Comedy.  That this was a worthwhile endeavor, that something like a 
workable theory of comedy could be distilled from the essay in the first place, may have 






for holding to the belief that it was, in fact, ultimately a valuable scholarly undertaking, and 
before I summarize what I feel was gained from doing so, I feel it would be constructive to 
first examine the possible objections that one might raise against such a pursuit.  For as I 
mentioned in the last chapter (V), even Schlegel, soon after the publication of his 
Aristophanes-essay in 1794, had already begun to change his views about the nature of 
comedy to the extent that they contradicted the Aristophanes-essay.   
If one looks at contemporary theories of comedy, one finds that the sort of question that 
Schlegel seeks to answer, namely the question as to what constitutes the rue essence of comedy, 
is today seldom thought to yield the most fruitful results.  For example, Robert Hume, in an 
overview of the state of comedic theory (1972) published in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, writes that theories of comedy in the preceding three decades could be grouped into 
two general categories: those that, from a psychological standpoint, tried to “‘explain’ comedy in 
terms of human response to the comic”, and those that, from a formalistic standpoint, sought to 
analyze canonical comedic works in an attempt to explain comedy’s formal attributes (Hume 
87).  Ruth Nevo, writing a decade earlier (1963), expressed a similar sentiment, claiming that the 
field was best thought of as two separate disciplines: the “theory of comedy” and the “theory of 
laughter” (Nevo 327).  And although Schlegel’s theory does in part concern itself with a 
psychological understanding of the comical, he came, as we have seen, to the unique conclusion 
that it has nothing to do with laughter essentially, but rather with joy.   
A perusal of more recent publications on the theory and criticism of comedy reveals that 
today, theorists in comedy must deal with a radically different comedic terrain than the one 






cartoons etc.  And the technological media by which comedies are transmitted have drastically 
changed96. Theatrical comedy today exists at the fringes, and unlike in Aristophanes’ time – and 
this is central to Schlegel’s theory –, it is not enjoyed by a general populace but rather by a 
cultured elite.  Schlegel’s theory, on the other hand, presupposes a dram tic institution wherein 
theatrical comedy has widespread appeal and functions as a communal activity.  Thus one might 
offer that even if Schlegel’s theory may have once been thought to be applicable as a theory of 
comedy, it no longer finds a comfortable home within the contemporary ter ain of comedic 
theories. 
  Despite, however, any reservations that one might have against extracting from 
Schlegel’s essay an independent self-supporting theory of comedy, I nevertheless believe that in 
doing so, I was able to highlight some of the more novel and interesting aspects – as yet un- or 
underemphasized – of Schlegel’s theory.  I would argue that some of th se insights can, and in 
some cases already have, found a home in comedic theory as it stands today.  I will briefly list 
these and then discuss them in more depth below:   
 
1. Comedy and the Historical Method: The first aspect relates to Schlegel’s beliefs about 
the peculiarity of comedy as opposed to other literary genres and to the historical method 
which he believes might thus be applied to it.  Comedy is different f om other literary 
genres not only in form and content, but as I discussed in Chapter IV.5, also in the public 
to which it addresses itself.  According to Schlegel, comedy’s content must reflect 
contemporary tastes, or else it falls on flat ears.  Further, as I showed, Schlegel believes 
                                                






that comedy tends, more so than tragedy, to appeal to the most common or mainstream 
tastes in a given society.  On account of this unique quality, comedy is also more 
dependent han other genres on social tastes, and consequently, Schlegel believes that one 
might study the social conditions necessary for producing the type of comedy that one 
sees as being ideal.   
 
2. Schlegel’s Notion of a ‘Comedy of Freude’:  The second aspect relates to Schlegel’s 
peculiar normative anthropological-psychological conclusion as to the ess nce of 
comedy, namely, that pure comedy is comedy that aids in the realization of Freude in 
those who experience it.  This was the subject of Chapter IV.1.  
 
3. Schlegel’s Emphasis on Freedom of Expression: Lastly, Schlegel’s emphasis on 
external freedom yields a startling conclusion, namely, that comedy’s realization, as 
Schlegel see it, is absolutely dependent on a society’s protection of artistic freedom of 
expression.  This was discussed in Chapter IV.3.  
 
 
Comedy and the Historical Method 
As I discussed in Chapter III, Schlegel’s theory of comedy was one of the first in Germany that 
was not at all interested in content, structure, characters, in short, the art of dramatic storytelling 
or of inducing laughter, but rather in why certain societies produced the comedies that they did.  
For him, the relevant dichotomy was not author/audience, but rather artwork/society.  He wished 
to develop a normative theory of comedy that still remained true to a historical approach, and 






utilizes – influenced to some degree comedic theories in the 19th century.  The influence of 
Schlegel’s essay is acknowledged in part by Profitlich, when he claims that the Schlegel brothers 
were responsible for initiating the popularity that Aristophanes enjoy d during the 19th century 
(Profitlich Komödientheorie 88).  However, Norbert Altenhofer’s collection of theories of 
comedy from the second half of the 19th century shows that many theorists during this time 
period took, at least indirectly, much more from Schlegel than simply his enthusiasm for 
Aristophanes97.  For example, Karl Hillebrand’s theory of what he terms ‘classical’ comedy 
(1873), and the methodology that underlies it, bears uncanny resemblance with Schlegel’s98, and 
though an in depth comparison of both theories lies outside the scope of this conclusion, I would 
nevertheless like to address some of the strongest parallels between the two because Hillebrand’s 
study can – from the perspective of the method it utilizes – be read as  more realized version of 
Schlegel’s own historical-aesthetic approach, and thus discussing it mi ht help clarify what is of 
value in Schlegel’s method.  The title of Hillebrand’s work – Die klassische Komödie und ihre 
Voraussetzungen – already gives an indication that Hillebrand, like Schlegel, is interested in an 
ideal (for Schlegel the pure, and for Hillebrand the classical comedy) and moreover that one can 
sensibly examine the prerequisites that make that ideal realizable99.  He asks the same essential 
                                                
97 Interestingly, in his Nachwort, Altenhofer nowhere mentions Schlegel’s influence.  In addressing the admiration 
for Aristophanes that these authors all share, Altenhofer makes the peculiar claim that only Hegel, among the 
German Idealists, recognized Aristophanes’ greatness: “Nur Hegel hat den ernsthaften Versuch unternommen, 
diesem Autor [Aristophanes, MB] seinen gebührenden Platz einzuräumen” (Altenhofer 216).  It hardly needs to be 
stated that F. Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay makes this claim untrue.   
98 In fact, the only real dissimilarity between the two in their approaches is that Hillebrand is not interested in the 
anthropological properties that drive humans to create and experience comedies. 
99 In fact the titles that Hillebrand gives his indivi ual chapters read like a condensed summary of Schlegel’s 
argumentative approach in the Aristophanes-essay: Vom Einfluß äußerer Umstände auf die verschiedene 
Dichtungsarten, insbesondere auf die Komödie; Vom inneren Zusammenhang zwischen Tragödie und Komödie; Von 
den nationalen Blütezeiten der klassischen Komödie und deren politisch-sozialen Voraussetzungen; Vom Zustand 






question as Schlegel: What does it take for societies to produce good comedies (good being 
defined respectively by each author)?  And like Schlegel, he believes that comedy and its 
aesthetic worth, more so than other literary genres, is dependent on societal circumstances.   
 
Nirgends scheint mir der Eingluß der Zeitumstände und der sozialen Verhältnisse 
stärker wirksam zu sein als in der Komödie […].  Die Komödie wendet sich 
unmittelbarer als jede andere Dichtungsart an die Masse des Publikums, an jene 




Like Schlegel, Hillebrand draws the logical implication that one thus arrives at the best 
understanding of what makes Classical ages of comedy possible, by examining the social, 
political and cultural conditions out of which Classical comedies arise.  He proceeds then to 
outline the various societal prerequisites he sees as being necessary.  First, Classical comedy 
requires “das Bestehen eines wirklichen Volkslebens”, which he altern tely calls “d[as] 
öffentliche Leben” (Altenhofer 66)100.  And second, from the standpoint of Bildung, it requires 
that the respective nation exhibit “eine fortgeschrittene Entwicklung des Denkens, das Fehlen 
literarischer und sittlicher Verfallserscheinungen, schließlich Popularität und nationale 
Verwurzelung des Theaters” (Altenhofer 85).  The parallels between Schlegel and Hillebrand are 
too apparent to ignore.  Hillebrand, like Schlegel, sees in comedy a unique art form whose 
aesthetic worth depends on sociological conditions.  It is a distinct peculiarity of Schlegel’s 
theory, and I have sought to emphasize this fact, that for him, society and comedy exist in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
Frankreich günstig sind; Von den Faktoren, die einer Entwicklung der Komödie in Frankreich ungünstig sind; 
Versuch einer Prognose über die künftige Form der klassischen Komödie in Frankreich (Altenhofer ix.). 
 
100 Interestingly, Hillebrand writes: “Der Geist der Öffentlichkeit ist de facto etwas ganz anderes als die öffentliche 






unique dialectic, and one can better understand a society by studying its comedies, but more 
importantly, one can better understand the preconditions for certain types of comedies by 
studying their societal context.  This insight of Schlegel’s is o provocative because it implies 
that comedy as a literary genre, on account of its character, lends itself to a particular 
methodological approach, namely the historical.  
 
 
Schlegel’s Notion of a ‘Comedy of Freude’   
One of the more peculiar and perhaps confusing aspects of Schlegel’s theory is that he so 
strongly advocates joy as being the central drive behind  ‘true’ comedy.  Thus though he, like 
many theorizers of comedy, begins from a psychological (Schlegel would have thought of it as 
an anthropological) premise, his theory does not concern itself with the comedic affe t or the 
mechanism behind the inducement of laughter.  In fact, it is one of the most unique aspects of 
Schlegel’s theory that it develops from a psychological premise and that it never heless makes no 
mention of the psychological mechanism that is traditionally thougt of as most characteristic of 
comedy, namely laughter.  Furthermore Fr ude is, as we have seen, conceived by Schlegel as an 
emotion that unifies individuals and transcends boundaries: “Nur der Schmerz trennt und 
vereinzelt; in der Freude verlieren sich alle Gränzen” (KAI 22).  Whereas laughter is so often 
thought of as arising out of divisions, discord, or contrast: “Erscheint das Lachen selbst als ein 
Ausdruck der Freude, so wird der Gegenstand des Lachens statt dessen zumeist in Kategorien 
der Negativität gekennzeichnet” (Reallexikon Komik 289).  Freude is, for Schlegel, an emotion 






menschliche[r] Kraft” (KAI 21), and he sees it as being best r presented in Greek comedy not on 
account of Aristophanes’ plays themselves; these are, after all, very often satirical.  Rather the 
Greeks best realized Freude in comedy because of the particular society and comedic institutions 
they had developed.  For Schlegel, Freude was the natural expression of their comedic 
festivities, which – unlike tragedy – granted all members of society the potential for participation 
in the comedic act.  “Das Athenische Volk”, writes Schlegel, “rblickte […] seine eigne 
Heiligkeit […] in der Schönheit eines Spiels” (KAI 24).   In fact, Schlegel’s understanding of 
Freude seems not unlike that of Henri Bergson’s, who sees joy, in opposition to mere pleasure, 
as being an affirmative expression of man’s creative faculties: 
 
Le plaisir n'est qu'un artifice imaginé par la nature pour obtenir de l'être vivant la 
conservation de la vie ; il n'indique pas la direction où la vie est lancée. Mais la joie 
annonce toujours que la vie a réussi, qu'elle a gagné du terrain, qu'ellea r mporté une 
victoire : toute grande joie a un accent triomphal. Or, si nous tenons compte de cette 
indication et si nous suivons cette nouvelle ligne de faits, nous trouvons que partout où 




Bergson wrote this around a hundred years after Schlegel’s death (1930), but the 
formulation seems nevertheless to get at the same affirmative understanding of joy by perceiving 
it as something that results not from the removal of obstacles but from the act of creation.   
Furthermore, the implied dichotomy in Schlegel’s theory between “Joyous Comedy” and 
“Derisive Comedy”, which I alluded to in Chapter IV.5 is, I think, quite interesting as a system 
of classification.  In fact, one might divorce from Schlegel’s theory of comedy its normative 
overtones and say that instead of positing a ‘true’ form of comedy, he advocates a specific type 






derisive comedy, on the other hand, is reflective, critical, pessimitic.  It arises, as Schlegel says, 
out of a “Lust am Schlechten” (KAI 31).  Comedy that depicts “das Lächerliche” (ibid.) – as 
opposed to “reine Freude” (KAI 20) – is only natural in a society, as Schlegel sees it, where 
individuals can take pleasure in laughing at the folly of others. “[Den roheren Mensch, MB] kann 
auch wohl das Komische eines leidenden oder schlechten Gegenstandes ergötzen.  […] Aber 
wenn der öffentliche Geschmack sich bildet, wenn der Verstand und die Reizbarkeit des 
Publikums sich verfeinern, so wird es die Werke, die es ehedem schön fand, beleidigend finden” 
(KAI 27).  The societal requirement for joyous comedy is a refined of public taste.  As I 
discussed in Chapter IV.2, Schlegel unfortunately never gives a completely satisf ing description 
of what exactly a refined public taste would constitute.  Nevertheless the distinction between 
joyous and derisive comedy, and Schlegel’s attempt to link these com dic types to particular 
societal conditions, is a provocative thought, and it might yield interesting results to look at 
existing comedies according to this dichotomy and to try to see whether or not there is any 
credence to the belief that they are indicative at all of particular common societal values, 
preoccupations, and conventions.  Can, one might ask, anything be said of a society that tends 
towards the satirical or towards the joyous in its comedy? 
 
 
Schlegel’s Emphasis on Freedom of Expression 
Lastly, one of the most interesting aspects of Schlegel’s theory is, as I showed in Chapter IV.3, 
that it takes the protection of artistic freedom to be an aesthetic n cessity.  More than simply 
pointing out that comedy flourishes in an open society, Schlegel maintains that an open society is 






that it is an essential precondition for any comedy that hopes to have any aesthetic worth.  
Whether this is true or not is another matter, and probably many people would argue that 
ultimately, it is not.  But the theory at least deserves acknowledgement as one of the first 
defenses of artistic freedom of expression.  And there does in fact seem to be some credence to 
the belief, for example, that in modern society, comedy tends to be censured more often than 
other types of literature.  Leonard Freedman, in his study of satire in both democratic and 
authoritarian regimes, comes to the – perhaps intuitively obvious, though nevertheless important 
– conclusion that “there is considerably more satire in democratic th n in authoritarian regimes” 
(Freedman ix).  Whether or not censorship affects comedy’s aesthetic worth, it inevitably affects 
its content101.   
Interestingly, though Schlegel perhaps could not have anticipated it, many nations did in 
fact move, over the following century, towards full freedom of speech.  And furthermore, it is 
only after a considerable amount of freedom was allowed to artistic expression that comedy 
returned to anything like the explicit satire that one sees in Aristophanes.  One is hard-pressed, 
for example, to find the extreme mockery of public figures in drama that one finds in 
Aristophanes, unless one looks in modern literature.  Of course true external freedom, as 
Schlegel sees it, has not been fully realized.  This is because external freedom cannot exist solely 
through political protection.  External freedom for Schlegel, as we have seen, means that a 
society grants full freedom to art, and in modern societies, we often observe that though 
                                                
101 Freedman indicates that there is no reason to believe that political censorship actually affects the aesthetic worth 
of comedy when he write that “Soviet satirist, even before Stalin clamped down on their efforts, worked within 
severe constraints.  It could well be that these very constraints explain the high quality and intensity of much satire 
under authoritarian regimes, which provoked a deep indignation against profound injustice and required the 






government censorship has been largely abolished, the force of political correctness is 
nevertheless strong enough to bend comedic output to its standards.  In this sense, it could be 
argued that political correctness acts as a sort of societally based censorship.  Furthermore, the 
robust culture of satire, which has persisted in comedy to the pres nt day, seems to indicate that, 
as Schlegel sees it, we are still far from realizing what Schlegel saw as internal freedom on a 
large scale.  In fact, it is doubtful whether Schlegel believed that what he saw as ‘true’ comedy 
could be achieved in anything less than a utopia, and I believe it is not a stretch to say that 
Schlegel’s theory, in so far as it grounds a comedic ideal in a societal ideal, constitutes an 
example of utopian thought.  As I discussed in Chapter V., Schlegel seems to indicate that 
comedy’s aesthetic worth might be promoted in a community with a democratic political 
structure, but its absolute perfection, as he sees it, must be reserved for a society that has realized 
both internal and external freedom to the point that it has no need for the political protection of 
free expression, or unsatisfactory approximations of the communal will, such as democracy 
provides.  As I showed in Chapter IV.5, though other genres might exist in idealized forms in 
imperfect societies, according to Schlegel, not the comedy.  Schlegel is adamant about this point 
and some scholars, specifically Brummack and Oesterle, have emphasized that Schlegel is 
necessarily implying a utopian home for comedy.  “Ist das tragisch bzw. erhaben Schöne in 
Zukunft [und Vergangenheit] realisierbar”, writes Oesterle, “so rückt die Verwirklichung des 
komisch Schönen unter Bedingungen künstlicher Bildung in utopische Ferne” (Oesterle 445).  
And, in fact, Schlegel seems to express doubt as to whether pure comedy will be realizable when 







Sie [die Komödie, MB] wird es [das höchste Schöne, MB] erreichen, wenn die Absicht 
vielleicht in einer späten Zukunft ihr Geschäft vollendet und mit Natur endigt, wenn 
aus Gesetzmäßigkeit Freiheit wird, wenn die Würde und die Freiheit der Kunst ohne 
Schutz sicher, wenn jede Kraft des Menschen frei und jeder Mißbrauch der Freiheit 
unmögliche sein wird (KAI 29). 
 
This passage from the Aristophanes-essay seems to imply that in such a future society, there 
would be no need for political protection.  The freedom required of art would be self-evident to 
all.  And society would become a sort of Bildungsutopie, rendering governmental force 
unnecessary.  It is one of the results of this study, that it is this utopian undercurrent in Schlegel’s 
theory, which ultimately goes furthest in keeping it from being applicable as a system for the 
interpretation of comedy, and which draws an inextricable link between an aesthetic ystem on 
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